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The doctrine of cybertrespass represents one of the most recent
attempts by courts to apply concepts and principles from the real
world to the virtual world of the Internet. A creation of state
common law, the doctrine essentially involved extending the tort
of trespass to chattels to the electronic world. Consequently, unauthorized electronic interferences are deemed trespassory
intrusions and rendered actionable. The present paper aims to
undertake a conceptual study of the evolution of the doctrine,
examining the doctrinal modifications courts were required to
make to mould the doctrine to meet the specificities of cyberspace. It then uses cybertrespass to examine the implications of
transposing property metaphors to the world of the Internet,
characterized by the absence of resource rivalry and the reality
of positive value enhancement through increased usage (i.e., a
network effect, whereby participation in use by many is a condition for value in use by any). It is argued that the transposition
of proprietary concepts to the Internet is done for purely instrumental reasons—reasons that derive neither from the nature of
the resource nor its usage. The paper then evaluates whether
such an instrumental use of proprietary concepts on the Internet
has any effect on the meaning ordinarily attributed to the concept
of property and the identification of property as an independent
institution of moral significance. It concludes by showing that the
relative neglect that doctrines such as cybertrespass have for
identifying the boundaries of the res over which the property
right is to operate, is capable of undermining the minimum core
of any understanding of property as an independent institution.

Introduction
With the exponential growth of the Internet over the course of the
last decade, courts and legislatures around the world have been forced to
evolve legal principles to govern interactions in cyberspace. While a
large number of these principles were original and developed de novo for
the Internet, a significant number involved applying the extant body of
legal rules to the virtual world. Property law by and large, fell into the
latter of the two categories. As the process of transposing property concepts to the Internet began, it soon came to be realized that this was
effecting a fundamental reconfiguration of the ways in which the Internet
was meant to be used and developed. The Internet, initially visualized as
a commons-based network was coming to be controlled extensively
through private monopolies, operating through property rights. Freedom
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and openness, considered by many to be the hallmarks of the Internet,
were coming to be replaced with extensive private control—characterized
1
by the term ‘propertization’.
The doctrine of cybertrespass emerged in this context, with the
courts’ application of the common law cause of action of trespass to
chattels to the Internet. Reasoning that electronic interferences with
server space constituted a tangible invasion, they thus found no problems
with applying the doctrine to the world of cyberspace. In the process of
adapting the doctrine to meet the requirements of cyberspace and fashioning a new remedy however, courts soon began to ignore the conceptual
nuances that it involved and had come to incorporate in recognition of the
nature of the resources it was applied in relation to, i.e., movables. As a
consequence, the body of law that has emerged in relation to cybertrespass
is replete with doctrinal ambiguities and inconsistencies.
Most of the literature that has thus far examined the doctrine of cybertrespass has tended to focus invariably on the broader policy issues
2
involved. Cybertrespass is thus viewed as characteristic of the propertization of the Internet and consequently, scholars have tended to focus the
debate on the implications of the doctrine and propertization in general
for the Internet as a whole. At one end of the spectrum are the critics of
this propertization, who argue that ‘over-propertizing’ the Internet and
related informational goods will actually curb technological creativity
3
and impede fundamental freedoms on the Internet. Specifically in the
context of cybertrespass, this school of thought argues that the doctrine
results in a form of ‘over-propertization’ that can actually impede the use
of and innovation on the Internet, that it poses a threat to fundamental
activities on the Internet or that it will impede the full realization of the
4
Internet’s value as a technology of freedom. At the other end of the

1.
See Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001).
2.
But see Daniel J. Caffarelli, Crossing Virtual Lines; Trespass on the Internet, 5 B.U.
J. Sci. & Tech. L. 6 (1999) (examining the application of four prominent justificatory theories
of property to the Internet and concluding that the law ought to recognize personal property in
web sites).
3.
See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 66 L & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 Duke L.J. 1783 (2002); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on
the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 561 (2001).
4.
See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 Cal. L Rev. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Cal. L Rev. 521
(2003); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L 27 (2000);
Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 421 (2002); R. Clifton Merrell, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80
Wash. U. L.Q. 675 (2002); Steve Fischer, When Animals Attack: Spiders and Internet Trespass, 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 139 (2001).
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spectrum are the economic libertarians, who argue that increased propertization is critical for the Internet so as to facilitate transactions on the
Internet, which would in turn result in the optimal allocation of re5
sources. In the context of cybertrespass, they argue that the doctrine
6
does not go nearly far enough, in propertizing virtual space.
What characterizes most of this literature on both sides of the debate
however is a relative neglect of the conceptual issues involved in the
transplantation of proprietary concepts to the Internet. While the doctrine
of trespass to chattels (on which cybertrespass is modeled) is undoubtedly one of tort law, it nevertheless is premised on the existence of an
underlying property right, which it seeks to vindicate, affirm and protect.
It therefore becomes crucial to examine how the understanding of ‘property’ gets transmogrified during this move from the real to the virtual
world. For over a century, legal theorists and philosophers have attempted to develop coherent theories to understand and justify the
institution of property. Using the doctrine of cybertrespass, the present
paper seeks to examine whether the application of property concepts to
the Internet has any impact on the core assumptions and conceptual tools
that underlie this understanding. It thus consciously attempts to analyze
the doctrine of cybertrespass from a conceptual angle, focusing on the
constitutive elements of the doctrine and its proprietary nature and discussing policy issues only in so far as they have a bearing on the
conceptual apparatus involved.
The paper attempts to show that just as the doctrine may have farreaching policy-related problems, so too does it have fundamental conceptual flaws that derive from the imprecision of perfunctorily
transplanting proprietary concepts from the real to the virtual world. It is
argued that the application of the property metaphor to the Internet
through the doctrine of cybertrespass is done for purely instrumental
reasons—that unlike in the context of other intangibles have no relation
to the resource sought to be protected. This represents a fundamental
shift from the ordinary deployment of property metaphors in the context

5.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law, 4 Texas Rev. L. &
Politics 103 (1999–2000); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
[1996] U. Chi. Legal Forum 207; Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is still Property, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 108 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old
Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 Ind. L.J. 804, 818–21 (2001).
6.
Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (2003); Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol. 147 (2005);
Richard Warner, Virtual Borders: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 117
(2002); Daniel Kearney, Network Effects and the Emerging Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 23
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 313 (2005) (arguing that a clear rule of cybertrespass will maximize
the efficiencies of online networks).
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of intangibles and is premised on an attempt to regulate individual behavior on the Internet through the use of property-tort doctrine.
Part I provides a detailed analysis of the doctrine of cybertrespass,
tracing its evolution in cases of unwanted mass electronic communications (spam) and examining the gradual crystallization of its constituent
requirements, with its resultant ambiguities. After examining the process
through which common law courts ordinarily create new property interests in intangibles (Part I.A) and the basics of the tort of trespass to
chattels (Part I.B), it proceeds to analyze the genesis of cybertrespass in
three phases (Part I.C). While the phases are chronological in sequence,
they each also represent a distinct conceptual approach that courts
adopted at the time, in turn representative of the relative levels of confidence with which they applied the doctrine to new situations. Part I then
concludes by examining possible reasons why courts chose the trespass
to chattels metaphor over the trespass to realty one, in the context of the
Internet and posits two possible explanations (Part I.D).
Part II attempts to focus on examining cybertrespass through the
prism that is property theory—examining possible reasons for the use of
the property concept on the Internet and identifying the conceptual problems associated with the same. It begins with an overview of what the
concept of property means and attempts to identify a minimum core of
commonality between some of the more prominent conceptions of property (Part II.A) and then examines the problems associated with the
metaphorical application of the property concept to intangibles and the
changes in some of the core assumptions of property that this might necessarily entail (Part II.B). Part II.C then argues that the metaphorical
application of trespass to chattels to the Internet faces an additional
problem; one associated with the precise identification of the resource
from which the exclusion is to operate, that derives from the layered nature of the Internet.
The paper then concludes by arguing that cybertrespass aptly illustrates the problems associated with the instrumental use of common law
theories, when such use ignores the doctrinal nuances that the common
law has come to develop.

I. Cybertrespass: New Cause of Action/Novel
Proprietary Interest?
A. Common Law Proprietary Entitlements in Information
How have courts approached the issue of creating or recognizing
novel proprietary interests in informational goods? The process through
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which this is usually done by courts, exhibits a synthetic interaction between the very right sought to be protected and the remedy through
which such protection is ultimately accorded. Does this render the conceptual distinction between a property right and a proprietary remedy,
redundant?
In relation to judicially-created proprietary entitlements, a point that
becomes readily apparent is the difference in approach between courts in
the United States and those in other common law jurisdictions, most notably the United Kingdom and Australia. Courts in the United States
have been more ready to create novel interests than their overseas coun7
terparts. While the reasons for the same are beyond the scope of the
present paper, it is crucial to bear this in mind, given that the doctrine of
cybertrespass is ultimately the creation of the American judiciary.
The courts’ readiness to break new doctrinal ground is shown par
8
excellence in International News Services (INS) v. Associated Press,
where the United States Supreme Court recognized in the plaintiff a
‘quasi-proprietary’ entitlement to restrict competitors from misappropriating news reports that it had expended time and resources to collect.
The defendant in this case, had copied news stories from the plaintiffs
east coast edition, for its own west coast edition. The majority of the
court, influenced by the seeming unfairness of letting one party free ride
on the efforts of another, found itself unfettered in fashioning a proprietary remedy under the head of ‘misappropriation’. Brandeis J, in his
forcefully worded dissent, made explicit the problems associated with
the judicial creation of novel proprietary interests, characterizing courts
9
as ill-equipped and powerless for the task. While the majority of the
Court went out of its way to make clear that the right it was creating
10
would operate only in personam and not in rem, it appeared much less
concerned with the need to establish the conceptual malleability of the
common law—crucial to the methodological legitimacy of its endeavor.

7.
For a general discussion, see Andrew Terry, Unfair Competition and the Misappropriation of a Competitor’s Trade Values, 51 Mod. L. Rev. 296 (1988); Gerald Dworkin,
Unfair Competition: Is the Common Law Developing a New Tort?, [1979] Eur. Intell. Prop.
Rev. 241; Sam Ricketson, Reaping Without Sowing: Unfair Competition and Intellectual
Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, [1984] U. New South Wales L.J. 1.
8.
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
9.
Id. at 267.
10.
Id. at 236. The Court observed, “we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of
either as against the public.”
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The Court’s approach in INS has been commended by Epstein as be11
ing an apt illustration of legal incrementalism; the minimalist
12
development of legal principles through individual cases and analogies.
While incrementalism may certainly be preferable to open-ended judicial
policy-making, it nevertheless remains true that when it involves radical
reformulations of entrenched doctrines (as it did in INS) to suit the requirements of an individual case, it sets a methodological precedent; a
precedent to the effect that there exists nothing within the realm of the
common law that militates against such individual reformulations of the
very conceptual apparatus.
By contrast, the High Court of Australia refused to allow a similar
13
reformulation in Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Co Ltd v. Taylor,
where the plaintiff sought to prevent the defendant from using valuable
information that it had obtained, of activities in which the plaintiffs had
invested considerable time and money. The plaintiff was the owner of a
public facility where horse races took place on a regular basis. The defendant owned the adjacent plot of land and erected a tower on his land
so as to overlook the plaintiff’s property and from the tower allowed the
broadcasting of information about the actual races as they occurred,
thereby enabling individuals to bet on the races without actually being
present at the facility. In expressly refusing to follow the majority opinion in INS, the Court noted that since the interest in question did not fall
into any of the well-defined categories recognized by the law, it would
14
not qualify for any form of protection.
While courts in Australia and the UK have been reluctant to formulate an independent quasi-proprietary remedy of misappropriation, this
does not imply that they are any less concerned than their American
counterparts, in protecting the commercial interests of the plaintiffs in
question. Their reluctance is thus restricted to the realm of creating novel
proprietary interests. In so far as they can achieve the same results through
existent doctrinal structures, their opposition to the result becomes far less

11.
Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85 (1992).
12.
For a general overview of incrementalism, also referred to as a variant of judicial
minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (1999). Sunstein makes the argument that a minimalist approach is likely to
reduce the deleterious consequences of judicial errors.
13.
(1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (HCA).
14.
Id. at 509 (per Dixon J). The decision in this case has since been re-affirmed by the
High Court in more recent cases, see Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v. Phillip Morris Ltd, (1984)
156 C.L.R. 414 (HCA).
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forceful.15 One area where they have managed to achieve the same relates to the common law cause of passing off.
The tortious doctrine of passing off has traditionally concerned itself
with the core element of misrepresentation. In the most basic terms, the
cause of action is said to arise when one person sells his own goods un16
der the pretence that they are those of another. The element of
misrepresentation has however in recent times, been expansively interpreted to cover situations that would ordinarily have been thought of as
falling under the category of misappropriation. This move from misrepresentation to misappropriation is however, very subtle and involves no
17
major reformulations of existing concepts.
Every instance of informational misappropriation involves a misrepresentation, though not necessarily vice-versa. Passing off has thus
evolved to now cover situations not only where the defendant passes off
his goods as those of the plaintiff, but also where the defendant passes
off the plaintiff’s goods as his own. The latter situation, while materially
different, in that it involves the free-riding on the plaintiff’s goodwill
(i.e., a misappropriation), is no less a misrepresentation (of source) and
consequently, common law courts have found little difficulty in extend18
ing passing off to cover this subtle variant as well.
The distinction between creating a novel tortious remedy for the
misappropriation of intangibles and subsuming the factual scenario under the existent form of liability for passing off is more than one of mere
nomenclature. It lies in the fact that the former approach effectively results in the creation of a new proprietary entitlement, while the latter
merely protects an existent entitlement (i.e., reputation or goodwill) un19
der a modified liability rule. Calabresi and Melamed, in their highly

15.
Id. In this context, Dixon J’s observations that the courts “have not in British jurisdictions thrown the protection of an injunction around all the intangible elements of value, that
is value in exchange, which may flow from the exercise by an individual of his powers or
resources whether in the organisation of a business or undertaking or in the use of ingenuity,
knowledge, skill or labour”, are of questionable applicability in the present context.
16.
Perry v. Truefitt, (1842) 6 Beav. 66, 49 E.R. 749. See also Warnink v. Townend &
Sons Ltd, [1979] A.C. 731 (HL).
17.
For a detailed analysis of this paradigm shift, see Michael Spence, Passing Off and
the Misappropriation of Valuable Intangibles, 112 L. Quart. Rev. 472 (1996).
18.
Cases most directly representative of this trend include the common law geographical indication cases: Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 277 (Ch. D);
Taittinger v. Allbev Ltd, [1994] 4 All E.R. 75 (CA) and those relating to character merchandising: Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd, [1991] F.S.R. 145; Hogan v. Koala
Dundee Pty Ltd, (1988) 20 F.C.R. 314.
19.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
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influential analysis,20 define a proprietary entitlement as one where the
removal of the entitlement by a person from another requires the former
to enter into a voluntary transaction with the latter to determine the value
21
of the entitlement. The state’s role is thus ordinarily restricted to intervening in order to restore the entitlement on the basis of the voluntarily
pre-determined value. In the case of a liability rule however, a person is
entitled to destroy the entitlement of another as long as he is willing to
pay an objectively determined amount for it; the distinction being that
the amount is determined objectively with the original owner’s subjec22
tive valuation having little bearing on the computation.
A rule safeguarding a claim by premising itself on the validity of a
pre-existent distribution and thereby seeking to restore the same, effectively crystallizes the claim into a property right. On the other hand, a
rule premised on the harm an activity causes, and seeking to neutralize
the same, without basing its normative legitimacy on any distributional
pattern, simply does not have this effect. Thus, if A takes something
away from B involuntarily; if the rule focuses on the harm B sustains in
the taking and forces A to effect a reparation, the situation is materially
different from one where the rule forces A to give the thing back to B,
even if B has sustained no harm at all (or even benefited from the taking). The latter, a property rule, affirms B’s very claim over the thing,
while the former, a liability rule, merely focuses on the immediate reality
23
of damage and seeks to remedy it.
The difference between the two may appear overly subtle, given that
the resource in question is often information, making the concepts of
removal, taking, restoration and destruction, little more than metaphors.
However, it is submitted that at the heart of the distinction lies the fact
that in relation to a liability rule, the law focuses more on the nature of
the defendant’s conduct than on the nature and form of the plaintiff’s

20.
Over fifteen opinions of American courts have relied on this analysis, including
several federal and state appellate decisions.
21.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 19, at 1092.
22.
Id.
23.
For a detailed exposition of the differences between the two regimes and their comparative merits and demerits in economic terms see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 757–73 (1996).
See also A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property
Right, Liability Rule and Tax Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1979); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40
U Chi. L. Rev. 681; James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995).
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initial entitlement itself, performing a sanctioning role rather than a vin24
dicatory one in relation to the plaintiff’s interests.
Thus, in constructing a common law remedy, courts have the option
of making the focus of their analyses, either the conduct of the defendant
or the defined interest of the plaintiff. In the realm of informational use,
we see common law courts in Australia and the UK favoring the former,
in deference to legislatures, which they deem better-equipped to identify
a protectable interest and the parameters of such protection. American
courts on the other hand, seem to consider it inefficacious to focus solely
on the conduct without defining the nature of the interest in question and
25
in so doing, have often created novel proprietary interests. The doctrine
of cybertrespass, as will become apparent, has evolved as a common law
remedy. It thus merits examination whether the doctrine was evolved as
a regulatory remedy, sanctioning the conduct of the defendant through an
extrapolation of the doctrines of trespass to land and chattel or whether
its emphasis lies in the creation of a new proprietary regime in a set of
virtual resources.
B. Tortious Remedies to Safeguard Proprietary Interests:
The Case of Trespass
Tort law in relation to property is said by Cane to perform what is referred to as a ‘vindicatory function’; i.e., the function of delineating the
boundary between what is owned by one person and what isn’t. It is thus
supposedly more concerned with the plaintiff’s actual interest, which it
26
seeks to protect, than it is with the defendant’s conduct. Without getting
into the debate of what exactly property is, let us assume for the moment, a working understanding that a proprietary interest is one which
represents a set of rights and liabilities in relation to a resource. Given
this vindicatory function, it is but logical that a tortious doctrine focusing
on sanctioning a certain form of conduct in the belief that it protects the

24.
Peter Cane defines the vindicatory function as that of demarcating the boundary
between “what is mine and what is yours.” See Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law
139 (1997).
25.
Id. at 1093–98. It is indeed interesting to note that in delineating the factors that are
often taken into consideration in choosing between a property and a liability rule for an interest, Calabresi and Melamed list “economic efficiency” as the primary one—involving a
determination of the administrative costs involved in enforcing the interest as well as the individual transaction costs that may be incurred in effectuating the realisation of the interest on a
regular basis. In this context, reference may be made to Holmes J.’s observations in E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours Powder Co v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), where he seemed to be alluding to the fact that designating an interest as a proprietary one may be for reasons of analytical
convenience.
26.
Cane, supra note 24, at 139.

BALGANESH TYPE.DOC

Spring 2006]

10/2/2006 2:08 PM

Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet

275

plaintiff’s proprietary interest, in fact serves to create, the very proprie27
tary interest it seeks to protect. It remains to be seen how true this is of
the tort of trespass, as it is applied to both real property and movables,
and of its virtual variant, cybertrespass.
Trespass to real property or land—trespass quare clausum fregit,
consists in the act of entering upon, remaining on or placing something
28
on another’s land without sufficient justification. Interestingly, liability
for trespass arises independent of any intention or knowledge on the part
of the defendant. It is thus no defence for the defendant to plead that he
was not aware of the boundaries of another’s property, as long as the entry itself was voluntary. Most importantly however, liability arises
independent of any proof of damage to the plaintiff’s interests (or alternately, damage is presumed to exist in the very act of trespass). This
point is critical and raises the immediate question of why this is so. Why
is trespass to land actionable iniuria sine damnum? The answer to this
seems to lie in the value that the law places on the inviolability of real
property—an interest that transcends monetary quantification, which a
29
damage condition would necessarily require. This interest in inviolability thus lies in protecting the owner’s possession from unwanted
intrusions (i.e., a privacy interest). The underlying rationale would appear to be the belief that each intrusion operates as an indirect challenge
to the plaintiff’s control over the resource in question, an element critical
to establishing an ownership claim.
Moving on now to movables; the tort of trespass to chattels is said to
have been committed when one person without lawful justification engages in any act of direct physical interference with goods in the
30
possession of another. Obvious cases would thus include misappropriation and willful physical damage. The question that however arises is
whether, like its real property counterpart, this tortious action too becomes actionable per se, i.e., without any proof of actual damage. In
other words, would any unjustified yet nominal physical contact with
another’s movables amount to an act of actionable trespass, under this
head?

27.
Something Cane himself seems to concede, Id. at 78.
28.
R.F.V. Heuston & R.A. Buckley, eds., Salmond and Heuston on the Law of
Torts 40 (1996).
29.
Id. at 41. See also Peter Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests 32–33
(1996). As the author observes, ‘actionability per se is important to the present discussion
because it indicates that the tort of trespass protects interests other than economic interests.
One of the most important of these interests is privacy.’
30.
Salmond, supra note 28, at 94.
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Under English common law, the position appears to be that it would.
According to Salmond, even an unauthorized touching would be an
actionable trespass, since here too the law is concerned with the protec31
tion of the owner’s privacy (i.e., the inviolability interest). Fleming
however believes that this isn’t necessarily the case, since the law is less
concerned with the protection of mere dignitary interests in relation to
32
movables. In this context, Fleming’s arguments seem to have more
merit, for the following reason—if the rationale underlying the recognition of an inviolability/dignitary interest in a resource is that every
nominal intrusion amounts to an affront to the owner’s control over it,
this is necessarily diluted in the context of movables. Since the chattel is
inherently capable of being subjected to de facto physical control (i.e.,
the characteristic of movability), there appears little necessity to add an
additional layer of de jure control in a nominal sense. In the event that
such de facto control is also interfered with, the issue becomes otiose,
since it would immediately raise the issue of actual damage, because the
interference would have deprived the owner of actual enjoyment, something a nominal interference would not.
This of course doesn’t mean that the law is any less concerned with
the inviolability of movable property than it is with the inviolability of
land. It however reflects an element of pragmatism—that the law ought
to step in only after recourse has been made to the element of self-help,
intrinsic to the very idea of movables.
Indeed, American tort law is exceptionally clear on this point. For an
action to lie under the tort of trespass to chattel, the law mandates that
the owner be dispossessed, that the chattel be impaired in condition,
quality or value, that the possessor be deprived of use for a substantial
time or that harm be caused to the possessor or a legally protected inter33
est of his. The reason for this is that the law permits an owner to use
34
reasonable force to safeguard his interest in the chattel. There appears
no reason to believe that the English common law is any different, in
authorizing the use of a reasonable and proportional degree of force in
35
self-defence.

31.
Id. at 95. Indeed, this is the position of the House of Lords in Leitch & Co v. Leydon, [1931] A.C. 90 (HL), where Lord Blanesburgh observed, “The wrong to the appellants in
relation to that trespass is constituted whether or not actual damage has resulted therefrom
either to the chattel or to themselves.” The House of Lords was of course relying on Pollock’s
treatise on tort law.
32.
John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts 59 (1998).
33.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 (1965).
34.
Id. at § 218 cmt. e.
35.
Salmond, supra note 28, at 129.
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The crucial question however is whether this distinction in the protection of the inviolability interest has any bearing on the vindicatory
function of demarcating the boundaries of ownership that the doctrine
plays. In this regard, it is submitted that the element of per se actionability is of less relevance than that of the strictness of the liability, in terms
of the defendant’s mental state. If the law is to perform the function of
defining the boundaries of a property interest (i.e., vindicatory role) effectively, it becomes critical for it to do the same without any regard for
the defendant’s reasons for an action, as long as they can be causally attributed to him, i.e., being voluntary in nature. The essence of the
vindicatory role thus lies in presuming the existence of the proprietary
interest as a matter of fact that operates in rem. To take a concrete example; if the law were to define my proprietary interest in my land by
holding liable a defendant who jumps onto it, it would make little difference to the contours of my interest to assess if the defendant did the
same intending to trespass or knowing that the land was mine. This is
because the very act of jumping onto my land challenges my control
over it. If the defendant could thus avoid liability by showing that he
didn’t intend to commit trespass or that he mistakenly believed the land
to be his or that of a third party, the law would be focusing on sanctioning his conduct rather than defining my interest and cease to perform an
exclusively vindicatory function.
Both forms of trespass, as they stand today require an intentional in36
terference. This is however different from an independent requirement
of intention. As long as the actor acts deliberately, the requirement is
satisfied, with no subjective requirement for an intention to actually trespass. The distinction is thus one between a subjectively intended action
37
and an intentional action. Thus, a mistake as to the fact of ownership or
the legal validity of the same has no bearing on the intentional nature of
the act, while it would have had a bearing on an independent requirement
of subjective intention; and consequently is inapplicable as a defence to an
38
action for trespass. Therefore, the strict nature of liability in a trespass
action accounts for its vindicatory function, since it presupposes the legal

36.
Fleming, supra note 32, at 59; Salmond, supra note 28, at 41; Restatement,
supra note 33, at § 217.
37.
For a discussion of this difference, in the unrelated context of contractual intent, see
generally David Goddar, The Myth of Subjectivity, 7 Legal Stud. 263 (1987); Timothy Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete Agreements, in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence 151–71 (Jeremy Horder ed., 4th series, 2000).
38.
Fleming, supra note 32, at 59; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 cmt. c
(1965).
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and factual existence of the proprietary right and sanctions any interference with the same.
One might seek to argue that the threshold requirement of intentionality too, detracts to some extent from the vindicatory function, in that it
sets the proprietary protection at a level lower than an absolute one.
However, it is submitted that this is an inevitable consequence of the fact
that all tort law in any form, ultimately requires the existence of some
39
correlativity between the plaintiff’s interest and the defendant’s actions.
In the absence of this correlativity, there would either be no reason to
hold a particular defendant liable at all or to hold him liable to the particular plaintiff. The requirement of intentionality ensures that the
conduct in question is legitimately the defendant’s, thereby safeguarding
the element of correlativity, without which the basis of liability would
cease to be tortious.
In situations where the proprietary interest is itself ambiguously defined (i.e., where the defendant would have no reason to suspect the
factual or legal existence of a proprietary interest), the sequitur of this
strict liability is that it effectively crystallizes the proprietary interest.
This, it is submitted, is precisely what happened in the context of the
doctrine of cybertrespass, which involved modifying the doctrine of
trespass to chattels to suit the realities of the virtual world.
C. The Evolution of Cybertrespass
This part examines in some detail the doctrinal genesis of cybertrespass. The analysis is categorized into three parts, reflective of both the
chronological development of the doctrine and the varied use of the doctrine itself. The first phase involved the move from the tangible to the
virtual world and was critical in that it unknowingly set the standard for
future expansion by preferring one metaphor to another. The second
phase further crystallized the doctrine into an independent proprietary
action and saw it being expanded to cover new areas, hitherto unforeseen. The third phase however generated a considerable degree of
ambiguity and here one sees pushes in both directions—for a further expansion of the doctrine and for a considered roll-back of the same.
Consequently, the present coverage of the doctrine remains somewhat
unclear.

39.

See generally, Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law ch. 5 (1995).
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1. Electronic Trespass: From the Real to the
Surreal and the Virtual
While the doctrine of trespass to chattels has existed for quite a
while, the first case that tested its applicability to new media was Thrifty40
Tel v. Bezenek, a case relating to the misuse of a telephone company’s
network. In this case, the defendants’ son had employed a computer
technology to crack the plaintiff company’s telephone access and authorization codes, in order to use its network for long distance telephony
without paying for the same. Initially, the plaintiff relied on the doctrine
of conversion, but encountered the objection that conversion was ordinarily never applied to intangibles, since the action was premised on a
dispossession, which often enough, could not be proven in the case of
41
intangibles. The court then decided to consider whether the facts were
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action that could accommodate the
intangibility element involved and thereupon proceeded to examine the
doctrine of trespass to chattels.
Relying on Prosser’s observations that trespass to chattels had
evolved into the ‘little brother’ of conversion and that it could arise from
a mere interference or use, short of a dispossession, the court found the
42
doctrine applicable to the facts of the case. What seemed to trouble the
court however was the fact that the doctrine had hitherto never been applied to anything intangible. The court therefore went to some length to
show how the element of tangibility had been relaxed in relation to the
43
doctrine of trespass. The problem with its analysis however, was that all
the authorities it cited to establish this point dealt with trespass to real
44
property, and not with movables. As we noted in our previous discussion, the law (American) makes a deliberate distinction between
trespasses to movables and immovables, by requiring a tangible harm in
the case of the former, but not in the latter. Consequently, it is understandable why an ephemeral intrusion would be actionable as trespass to
real property; but it is indeed questionable whether the law ought to recognize the same in the context of movables as well. Nevertheless, the

40.
46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (1996).
41.
Id. at 1565–66.
42.
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 85–86 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984).
43.
Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal.App.4th at 1567.
44.
Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., (1982) 32 Cal.3d 229, 185 Cal.Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d
922; Roberts v. Permanente Corp. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 526, 10 Cal.Rptr. 519 (both dealing
with dust particles); Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (1985) 104 Wash.2d 677,
709 P.2d 782 (dealing with microscopic airborne particles).
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court concluded that ‘electronic signals’ were ‘tangible enough’ to con45
stitute trespass.
Surprisingly, the court also side-stepped the entire issue of requiring
the plaintiff to show ‘actual damage’ for the cause of action to arise at all.
In its discussion, the court categorically observed that the plaintiff ‘pre46
sented no evidence of any actual losses’. One is therefore left wondering
why the court’s analysis of the doctrine appeared prima facie perfunctory. The answer may well lie in the court’s perceived need to find some
doctrine to overcome the tangibility restriction it encountered in relation
to conversion. The doctrine of trespass seemed to provide the best answer. The court should have stopped here and proceeded with caution in
maintaining the subtle doctrinal divide that existed between movables
and immovables. Instead, in its zeal to find an independent cause of action it conflated the two.
In making the transition from the material to the virtual world of
electronic signals, the court in Thrifty-Tel assumed that the metaphor of
chattels was most appropriate to the situation. The assumption that intangible resources, such as information or electronic signals can be more
aptly regulated using legal doctrines governing chattels than through
those applicable to land, seemed to be at the root of the court’s choice of
metaphor. In a sense, had it chosen to analyze the situation in terms of
landed interests—that the telephone network itself was more analogous
to real property than it was to personal property, in being incapable of
actual physical control at all times, the metaphor of trespass to land
might have been more suitably employed, avoiding the conceptual confusion that the court seems to have gotten itself into. This problem was
only exacerbated when the law came to be applied to the Internet.
This happened the very next year. In CompuServe v. Cyber Promo47
tions, Inc, an online service provider brought an action against a
company that was in the business of sending unsolicited email advertisements, alleging that by doing so through its (i.e., plaintiff’s) servers
and to its customers, it was committing trespass to chattels. Following
from the Thrifty-Tel opinion, the court here observed that the requirements for trespass to chattels were much less stringent than those
required for a conversion claim and that a substantial interference with
possession was not required to establish the former. All the same, the

45.
Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal.App.4th at1567.
46.
Id. at 1564. All the same, it notes that the defendants’ actions resulted in the tying
up of the company’s system. One wonders whether this line of analysis ought to have been
carried a little further to examine whether the ‘tying-up’ was tantamount to a dispossession or
whether it caused any material damage to the system or its resources.
47.
962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (hereinafter Compuserve).
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court appeared conscious of the restriction placed on the doctrine by the
requirement of actual damage and that the plaintiff had to show harm to
the property or a diminution in its quality, condition or value as a result
48
of the defendant’s actions.
On the basis of the plaintiff’s allegation, the court found two types of
damage to exist. The first was that the multiple email messages occupied
a large amount of disk space on the plaintiff’s servers and were a drain
on their processing power. This, according to the court diminished the
value of the equipment to the plaintiff, even though there was no physi49
cal damage. The second form of damage, according to the court lay in
the fact that since the defendant’s emails were directed through the
plaintiff’s servers at the plaintiff’s customers, it had caused several of
these customers to complain about the plaintiff’s very service. Consequently, the court found this to be an interference with the plaintiff’s
reputation and goodwill, a legally protected interest, actionable under the
50
doctrine as well.
On the first form of damage, the court’s reasoning appears conspicuously flawed. To begin with, the court overcomes the physical tangibility
requirement by concluding that electronic signals were sufficiently tangible for the purposes of trespass. Therefore, the routing of electronic
mail messages through the plaintiff was a form of physical contact. All
the same, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s servers were impaired by
their receipt of multiple e-mail messages. But these messages are what
the servers are built to handle fundamentally (therefore making the situation materially different from sending smoke onto another’s land). What
brings about the impairment is not so much the contact itself (i.e., the
signals), but the consequence of the contact and the fact that they were
unwanted by their intended recipients.
The impairment condition in trespass exists as a physical requirement—i.e., that the contact itself must have directly caused the
impairment. In the CompuServe case it wasn’t the factum of the contact
that was causing the impairment, but an allied consequence—i.e., not the
messages themselves but the unwanted nature of what was contained in
the messages. The distinction lies in that a factual-contact requirement is
an objective determination (of causality), while a consequence-driven
one renders the determination subjective and incompatible with the
physical-nature of the requirement. Thus, the plaintiff would have been
unlikely to complain, in the event that its customers did indeed derive
48.
Id. at 1021–23. The court here made reference to § 218 of the Restatement: Restatement, supra note 33, at § 218.
49.
Id. at 1022.
50.
Id. at 1023.
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value from the messages they received from the defendant. It was thus
more the content of the messages, rather than the very sending that the
plaintiffs were unhappy about. Apart from this is of course the obvious
issue that when the law mandates a diminution in value, it requires the
same objectively. If the requirement were merely that the value of the
resource to its owner be diminished, it would render the very require51
ment moot, something which the court appears to have overlooked.
Coming to the second form of damage found by the court, here too
the law appears to require that the interference with a legal interest be a
52
form of physical harm flowing from the initial harm. Further, it remains
open to debate whether the allowance made for harm to goodwill/reputation is sufficiently direct, as required by the law.
The court in CompuServe, was presented with the problem of adopting a suitable metaphor to develop a regulatory framework dealing with
unwanted mass electronic mails, and it chose that of chattels, i.e., movables. While it is true that in a sense, the Internet is composed of
innumerable individual computer servers, each of which is the personal
property of its owner, it remains possible to analyze the Internet as an
53
independently existent space. In deciding to focus on the private ownership of the constituent elements of the Internet, the CompuServe court
consciously decided to limit its analysis to movables. In so doing however, the court failed to recognize that the law adopts different standards
for chattels and landed interests, deriving from their inherent properties.
Moved by the relative ease of recognizing the Internet as little more than
its movable elements—movables, while at the same time seeking to
transpose the legal standard for immovables to it, the court’s analysis
appears doctrinally flawed.
From another perspective however, the court’s reluctance to analyze
the Internet as an immovable place may have derived from a genuine
concern with the unregulability of the Internet as a whole. If the court
had headed down the path of analyzing the Internet as a form of realty, it
would have had to grapple with the fundamental issue of ownership (i.e.,
who owns the space in question?) and its incidents (i.e., what are the
consequences of owning a space on the Internet? Is it to exclude all oth-

51.
The Restatement does however recognise special situations where an interference
not affecting the physical condition of the chattel may effectively destroy the value of the
chattel to the possessor, rendering it actionable—e.g., where a toothbrush is used by another
person or where an intimate piece of clothing is worn by another. These seem to be recognised
however as exceptions to the general rule. See Restatement, supra note 33, at § 218 cmt. h.
52.
For a detailed discussion, see Burk, supra note 4, at 34–36.
53.
For an overview of the implications of the same, see Hunter, supra note 4; Lemley,
supra note 4.
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ers from entering?). Many of these questions have arisen in relation to
the issue of domain names, but in the completely different framework of
54
trademark law.
One of the consequences of adopting a realty-based analysis would
have been the implications it has for the ‘public forum’ doctrine. In its
simplest form, the doctrine stipulates that in relation to certain places
which have traditionally been used by the public to communicate and
exchange ideas and information, the public has certain affirmative rights,
privileges and liberties to use the same for such communication and ex55
change. In a 1996 case, a United States Supreme Court justice had
openly observed that the time may be ripe to consider the implications of
56
extending the public forum doctrine to new communications media.
Consequently, had the court decided to analyze ownership of the Internet
as a whole, it would have had to consider directly, some of these controversial implications that such an analysis would have invariably had and
which were alluded to by the defendants in the course of their argu57
ments. In this reading then, the court’s choice of metaphor was
prompted by a sense of avoidance.
The CompuServe court’s analysis thus provided a precedent for
plaintiffs seeking to find a new cause of action to control unwanted bulk
58
emails. By focusing on the actual use of the individual server, reasoning
that electronic signals were physical enough and concluding that the
very usage and its subsequent consequences were sufficient damage for
the purposes of actionability, the court effectively adapted the common
law cause of trespass to chattels to the digital world. By failing to maintain the bright line divide between trespass to realty and chattels that the

54.
See generally Victoria Holstein–Childress, Lex Cyberus: The UDRP As A Gatekeeper To Judicial Resolution Of Competing Rights To Domain Names, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev.
565 (2004).
55.
See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
56.
In Denver Area Education Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996), Kennedy J observes:
Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public
consciousness occur in mass and electronic media . . . The extent of public entitlement to participate in those means of communication may be changed as
technologies change.
See also Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the
Electronic Environment, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 149 (1998) (discussing the broader implications of such an expansion).
57.
Indeed, some of the observations of the CompuServe court indicate a general aversion to dealing with issues of Internet regulation. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
58.
See generally, Steven E. Bennett, Canning Spam: Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber–
Promotions, Inc., 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 545 (1998).
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law had, for centuries, it was obvious that it would only be a matter of
time before other instances necessitated courts to head even further down
the slippery slope—effectively rendering the requirements of cybertrespass analogous to those of trespass to land.
Two cases followed the CompuServe decision with similar facts and
59
analyses. In both these cases an Internet service provider had commenced an action against defendants who were sending out bulk emails
using the provider’s server to the provider’s own customers. The courts
decided that the operators’ conduct amounted to trespass to chattels and
granted the providers injunctions, restraining the same. Carrying on from
where the CompuServe court left off, in both these cases the court took
for granted that the use of the provider’s network and the resultant harm
to goodwill were sufficient damage to satisfy the harm requirement in
relation to chattels. Indeed, neither court based its conclusions on anything more than the plaintiff’s assertions that such damage had been
60
sustained.
It thus became glaringly obvious to anyone that it was only a matter
of time before the ‘harm’ element became little more than a nominal requirement, serving no purpose other than to justify the origins of
cybertrespass—as emanating from the doctrine of trespass to chattels.
Recent trends seem to corroborate the same. In the recent case of Tyco
61
International (US), Inc v. Does, the defendants had loaded the plaintiff’s servers with over 30,000 email messages and were restrained from
continuing their activities, under the doctrine of trespass to chattels. Interestingly, the court here awarded the plaintiff nominal compensatory
damages of $1. The court based this award on the reasoning that the
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate or claim any loss or damage to its sys62
tems as a result of the defendants’ actions. This is indeed surprising. By
its own admission, the court seemed to be concluding that it found
against the existence of any tangible harm or damage, but it nevertheless
proceeded to conclude the cause of action itself to have been made out.
Instead of concluding that the lack of harm necessitated only nominal
compensation, the court should have found that this fact alone militated
against the plaintiff’s trespassory claim.

59.
America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (hereinafter
AOL–I); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (hereinafter
AOL–II). Interestingly, both cases were decided by the same District Court.
60.
AOL–I, 24 F. Supp.2d at 550; AOL–II, 46 F. Supp.2d at 452. It may of course have
been determined by the fact that both cases involved motions for summary judgement by the
plaintiff.
61.
2003 WL 23374767 (S.D.N.Y.).
62.
Id. at 3–4.
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This case only makes clear the conceptual obfuscation that was imminent in the CompuServe court’s reasoning. By setting a doctrinally
unclear precedent in the early stages of the law’s development, the court
unknowingly added a taint of legitimacy to the doctrine itself being extended, mutated and applied to factual circumstances it hadn’t initially
envisaged.
2. From Web Space to Information: Ebay and Register.com
One of the first few areas where one observed the expansion of the
doctrine of cybertrespass, following the CompuServe case was in relation
to actual web-site content. Traditionally, content has always been the
subject matter of established intellectual property rights—most notably
copyright. However, these rights, including copyright are subject to a
plethora of limitations—relating to the subject matter and duration of
63
their coverage. In order to ensure that these limitations are not evaded
through a mix of contract and property rules by individual actors,
American copyright law further recognizes a doctrine known as ‘preemption’. The doctrine of federal copyright pre-emption, as it is known,
mandates that no person is entitled to assert any claim in relation to a
right that is the equivalent of an exclusive right conferred by copyright,
64
outside the realm of copyright law itself. Consequently, for factual
compilations or information databases that do not qualify for copyright
protection, claims outside of copyright are ordinarily barred; unless such
claims assert an ‘extra element’ that take them beyond the coverage of
65
the ordinary exclusive rights available under copyright.
As a consequence, when the doctrine of cybertrespass came to be
pleaded in relation to website content, the first question that arose was
whether the claim was necessarily pre-empted by copyright law. In
66
Ticketmaster Corp v. Tickets.Com Inc, the plaintiff owned a web-site
that sold tickets for different events online. For these events, it usually
had the exclusive right to sell tickets on the Internet. The defendant was
a service that listed events date-wise and where it did not directly sell
tickets for the same online, it provided a link to the interior web-page on
the plaintiff’s site that listed the event with its details and enabled the
63.
For instance, copyright is said to subsist only in the expression of an idea and never
in the idea itself. Mere facts are similarly not protectable under copyright. Further, to qualify
for protection under copyright, a work needs to meet the requirement of originality and in
some cases an additional requirement of creativity as well.
64.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
65.
See generally Schuyler Moore, Straightening out Copyright Preemption, 9
U.C.L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 201 (2002); Marc S. Williams, Copyright Preemption: Real–time Dissemination of Sports Scores and Information, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 445 (1998).
66.
2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal.).
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customer to buy the ticket (but from the plaintiff). By clicking on this
link, the customer was taken directly into the interior of the plaintiff’s
web site and did not have to navigate his way all over again when he
reached the site. The plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendant alleging copyright infringement and among other claims,
raised a common law claim for trespass to chattels, since the link was in
essence connecting the defendant’s site to the plaintiff’s. The court
however dismissed the trespass claim, finding it to be pre-empted by
federal copyright law, since the essence of the action was that the
defendant had appropriated (i.e., copied) information from the plaintiff’s
67
own page.
In Ticketmaster, the court managed to block the trespass claim since
the only form of connection (physical, or otherwise) the plaintiff alleged
was a hypertext link to its site, which the court in turn reasoned had
more to do with the actual content of the site, than the method of contact
itself. Had the method of contact or information collection been more
elaborate and perceptibly invasive, the court may well have found the
claim to be applicable, since it would have then related more to the
means deployed in collecting the information than to the consequence of
the collection, i.e., copying. This is precisely what happened in the case
68
of eBay, Inc v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc, where the plaintiff managed to structure the claim as one relating to the very means of information collection
and thereby succeeded in downplaying the copying or misappropriation
69
element involved.
The plaintiff in that case, owned and operated an online auction site,
which offers sellers the ability to list their items for sale on its site and
prospective buyers the ability in turn to search the listings and place bids
on items. The item is then sold to the highest bidder, with the transaction
taking place directly through the buyer and the seller, with the plaintiff
70
having no involvement in this process. The defendant in turn operated
an auction aggregation website, which offered online auction buyers the
facility of searching for items across numerous online auction sites (including eBay) without having to visit each site individually. For this
purpose, and to expedite the recovery of information, the defendant site
maintained its own searchable database. Information for this database,
consisting of the details of the various current bids, was collected by the

67.
Id. at 4.
68.
100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal., 2000).
69.
See generally Edward W. Chang, Bidding on Trespass: Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge,
Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace–Law, 29 AIPLA Quart. J. 445 (2001).
70.
For a general overview of how the eBay site works, see Adam Cohen, The Perfect Store: Inside eBay (2002).
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defendant by deploying ‘electronic spiders’. In their simplest form, electronic spiders are computer programs that query other computers over
71
the Internet for large quantities of information; they thus automate the
process of information collection. It is important to note that the information itself, is neither confidential (being available to the public which
visits the auction site itself) nor proprietary, consisting of purely factual
data. Initially, the defendant had sought and obtained permission from
the plaintiff to collect this information using its spiders. Subsequently
however, negotiations between the parties fell through and the plaintiff
proceeded to commence an action against the defendant, alleging that the
defendant’s continued deployment of spiders to collect information from
its site, without its permission and in spite of its communications to the
72
defendant to cease such collections, violated its rights. Among numerous causes it claimed for, was that of trespass to chattels.
At the district court, the plaintiff seemed to put forth the argument
that there were no good reasons for treating websites and Internet servers
any different from ordinary realty. Indeed the same argument was to be
made later in an amicus brief filed in favor of the plaintiff after the district court delivered its opinion. The brief argued that this allowed the
owner to internalize the costs connected with the resource itself and enabled him to create various proprietary interests (i.e., easements,
73
licenses, leases, etc.) in relation to the site. Surprisingly, the court
seemed to accept this theory, at least partially.
Carrying on from the reasoning in Thrifty-Tel and CompuServe, the
court concluded that the electronic signals sent by the defendant onto the
plaintiff’s site were sufficiently tangible to support the cause of action. It
then proceeded to establish that the defendant’s activities were unauthorized—both expressly by the communication it had received from the
plaintiff and tacitly, by the terms of the site’s usage. Acknowledging that
the crux of the action lay in showing an intermeddling with the plaintiff’s
possessory interest, and at the same time conceding that the level of interference required to constitute an intermeddling was uncertain, it concluded

71.
Also referred to as software robots, robots, spiders or webcrawlers. In recent times,
the shortened word ‘bot’ is usually used to refer to an electronic spider of the nature described
above.
72.
It is important to note that the plaintiff’s web site contained a set of terms and conditions, one of which stated expressly that the use of robots to copy content from the site
without prior permission was prohibited. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
73.
See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae eBay 100 F. Supp.2d at 67. Among those who
worked on this brief was Prof. Richard Epstein, a renowned professor in the field of law and
economics. For an overview of Epstein’s views on the subject, see Epstein, supra note 6; Epstein, supra note 5, at 818–21.
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that the defendant’s actions amounted to a use of the plaintiff’s computer
74
systems, sufficient to constitute an intermeddling for trespass to apply.
Recognizing that the element of damage was crucial for a claim of
trespass to chattels to succeed, the court concluded that the defendant’s
very use of the plaintiff’s system, however minimal it may have been, used
valuable bandwidth and capacity and thereby deprived the plaintiff of using the same at the same time. It further observed that if it were to hold
otherwise, it would only encourage other aggregators to send spiders onto
the plaintiff’s site thereby actually affecting the functioning of the site.
The court seems to have taken into consideration the additional element
75
of potential harm as well, in assessing damage.
In a sense, the court’s ruling in eBay seems to bring down in its entirety, the conceptual divide between trespass to chattels and realty that
previous courts had sought to maintain, at least nominally. Its observation that “the law recognizes no such right to use another’s personal
76
property” aptly illustrates this point. As noted earlier, in an action for
trespass to chattels, the law’s concern is not with the nominal inviolability of the owner’s right, since the owner is privileged to use reasonable
force to safeguard his asset. Consequently, a mere use without any
physical harm would not be actionable, unless the resource in question is
realty.
It remains conspicuously clear from the court’s reasoning that it was
moved by the apparent unfairness of the defendant’s free-riding on the
plaintiff’s information and the possible economic effect this might have
on the latter’s business. It therefore needed to find the defendant’s conduct actionable per se. One therefore fails to realize why it didn’t opt to
analyze the case in terms analogous to an action for trespass to land,
more so since this doctrine was raised before it as an alternative. This
isn’t to imply that adopting the trespass to land doctrine would have
solved all problems; just that it would have avoided the conceptual conflation that the court’s reasoning has given rise to.
The eBay court’s recognition of an exclusionary right in relation to
the plaintiff’s compilation of information also had the effect of according
proprietary protection to an informational resource for which intellectual
property protection had for a while been a controversial subject—
databases and compilations. The position of US law since the 1990s has
been that mere compilations of information are not protectable under

74.
75.
76.

eBay, 100 F. Supp.2d at 1070.
Id. at 1071–72.
Id. at 1071.
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copyright law unless they involve an element of creativity.77 Ordinarily,
one might have thought that the cause would have been pre-empted by
federal copyright law. The court however expressly noted that this was
not the case since the trespassory cause of action here focused on the
misuse of the plaintiff’s physical property (i.e., its servers) and conse78
quently, consisted of an extra element that ensured its sustainability.
A sequitur of the court’s reasoning, likening use to harm is that it
renders palpably legitimate uses of a website actionable at the fancy of
the website owner. Most web-based search engines today collect information for their databases using electronic spiders, which they
79
periodically send out to retrieve information. Ordinarily, a spider accessing a web-site is expected to check whether it is authorized to collect
information before it actually crawls any deeper. Sometimes however,
80
the spider doesn’t carry out this check—either purposively (as programmed) or owing to a malfunction. In each of these cases, the owner
of the website, going by the eBay court’s reasoning could hold the search
engine liable for cybertrespass, even in the absence of any palpable
harm.
By placing the onus on a user to verify whether a certain mode of
accessing the website was permissible at all, the court was in effect
erecting an artificial fence around the website, the crossing of which
would give rise to a trespassory claim. As Steve Fisher notes, this
changes the fundamental operative paradigm of the Internet. The Internet, ever since its creation, has been premised on a culture of openness—

77.
This position is indeed unique to the United States, following the decision of its
Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
In an amicus brief filed by a group of 28 law professors on behalf of the defendant, when
the case was taken on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, this argument was pressed again, with the
explicit observation that the creation of such a right ought to be the prerogative of a legislative
body and not a judicial forum.
78.
eBay, 100 F. Supp.2d at 1072. For a general overview of the legal issues involved in
the proprietary protection of valuable pricing information, see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping
Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 Van. L. Rev.
1965 (2000).
79.
See Danny Sullivan, How Search Engines Work, http://searchenginewatch.
internet.com/webmasters/ work.html (last visited February 10, 2005).
80.
As was the case with Bidder’s Edge, eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. A spider/robot
accessing a website to retrieve information ordinarily verifies the command lines of a file
called—“robot.txt” before it proceeds any further on a site. The nature of information it is
permitted to retrieve and which it is to omit is to be specified therein. Importantly though, the
robots.txt process, detailed in a self-regulatory document called the “Robot Exclusion Standard” is not an official standard, nor is it a part of web sites’ terms of use and access.
Consequently, a non-adherence to the standard, i.e., not making the spider check the text of
robots.txt, while contrary to settled best practices, is not illegal or actionable on its own.
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where access has been presumed to be the de facto rule, with individual
actors being given the choice of ‘opting out’ by adopting bright-line exclusionary techniques (such as encryption, passwords, authentication
81
techniques and the like). The court’s reasoning effectively alters this. By
creating a ‘presumptive fence’, which a user was now legally obligated to
look out for, the default rule was being altered to one of less than complete openness.
The decision in eBay all but eliminated the harm requirement in cybertrespass, thereby bringing into question its continued conceptual
affiliation with the doctrine of trespass to chattels. Reasoning in almost
identical terms was adopted by the court in another decision that fol82
lowed shortly after eBay—Register.Com, Inc v. Verio, Inc The plaintiff
there, Register.com was an Internet domain name registrar, which also
offered its customers website creating and hosting facilities. All domain
name registrars, were in turn required to provide an online WHOIS database—a searchable database consisting of the names and contact details
of all customers who had registered their domain names through the registrar in question. Registrars were also mandated to make this database
freely accessible to the public through the Internet. Accordingly, Regis83
ter.com maintained one such database.
The defendant, though not a registrar, provided registrants with facilities to develop and host their own websites. It thus competed directly
with the plaintiff, in the post-registration market. To enhance its own
market, it began an operation which involved downloading a list of
newly registered domain names from a central server. Once the names
were retrieved for each day, it then deployed a search robot which queried
the central server to determine the name of the registrar with whom the
domain was registered and then automatically proceeded to query the
WHOIS database of the concerned registrar to obtain the contact details of
the registrant. The plaintiff was one such registrar queried by the defendant’s robots. Concerned that the defendant was effectively free-riding on
its own work, the plaintiff brought an action against Verio, alleging nu84
merous causes including trespass to chattels.

81.
Fischer, supra note 4, at 168–70. Fischer also provides a detailed analysis of how
different electronic robots and spiders operate, how they are deployed by agents on the Internet and technical options that exist to exclude them without resorting to a legal trespassory
rule.
82.
126 F. Supp. 2d. 238 (S.D.N.Y., 2000).
83.
Id. at 241–42.
84.
Id. at 243. The other causes of action included breach of contract, a claim under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and another under the provisions of the Lanham Act for
falsely designating origin.
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The court’s reasoning on the trespassory claim was almost identical
to that of the eBay court, which it relied on extensively. The court observed that the defendant’s use of robots to access the plaintiff’s system
resulted in a diminution of the latter’s system resources—the extent to
which was, of course, uncertain. This was the same as saying that the
harm lay in the very use, since any use effectively results in some diminution of system resources (the system itself, being of finite capacity).
The court then concluded that a mere showing of possessory interference was sufficient to establish harm and accordingly proceeded to find
that the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing the existence of trespass (to
85
chattels). This makes it unambiguously clear that the court was insistent
on adopting a ‘trespass to land’ standard in its analysis. The reasoning
86
and decision of the district court was unanimously affirmed, on appeal.
The district court’s decision however raises several issues, which the appellate court did not examine in any detail.
For one, why didn’t the court resort to a land-analogy for websites
explicitly, without interpreting the law as it did, to effectively render redundant the chattel-realty divide? We can put aside our speculative
inquiry into the reasons for the court’s reluctance for later and conclude
by noting that the eBay and Register.com cases had the effect of crystallizing the evolution of a new proprietary remedy on the Internet, in
relation to websites; a remedy that related not just to the appropriation of
content, but one that related to the very use and access of parts of the
Internet.
3. Recognizing The Doctrinal Ambiguity: Hamidi and After
A plain reading of the eBay and Register.com decisions would lend
support to the argument that the courts had all but abandoned the requirement of actual damage in favor of a ‘mere use’ test of possessory
interference. Indeed this is precisely how a few subsequent decisions
interpreted these cases as well. In Oyster Software, Inc v. Forms Process87
ing, Inc, the defendant had made use of the plaintiff’s trademark name
in its metatags, thereby causing search engines to link to the wrong site.
In dealing with the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s actions constituted a trespass to chattels, the court concluded in express terms that
after eBay, in relation to electronic trespass, the law no longer required a
showing of substantial interference and that a minimal element of pos-

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 250.
Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal.).
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sessory interference or ‘use’ would suffice to establish the claim.88 This
interpretation, while eminently problematic conceptually, was nevertheless an accurate restatement of the judicial development of the law. In
more recent times however, courts have disputed this interpretation,
while at the same time reaffirming the approach in eBay, thereby making
their own contribution to the existent doctrinal ambiguity.
Ken Hamidi, a former Intel engineer, formed an organization to disseminate views and information critical of Intel’s employment and
personnel practices. The organization maintained a website and over a
period of under two years sent all of Intel’s employees six mass emails,
criticizing Intel’s practices and urging employees to move to another
company. Each of these messages was sent to about 35,000 addresses.
When Intel tried blocking several of them, Hamidi managed to evade the
blockade by using an alternate computer to send them. Intel then sent
Hamidi a message asking him to stop sending out mass emails to its employees; but he responded that he had the right to communicate what he
felt and continued to send out mass mails. Intel then brought an action
against Hamidi and his organization, alleging trespass to chattels and
sought an injunction against them.
At the first instance, the court found in favor of Intel, reasoning that
trespass to chattels required a showing of ‘unauthorized use’, which had
89
been established here. It accordingly issued a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from sending unsolicited emails to the plaintiff’s
computer systems. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the injunc90
tion. Its reasoning is however of interest. The court undertook a detailed
examination of the doctrine of trespass to movables and the manner in
which authors and past judicial decisions had interpreted the doctrine. In
specific it noted the divergence that existed between the approaches in
91
England and the United States, discussed earlier. The court then
reached the startling conclusion that the divergence was irrelevant, once
the nature of remedy sought shifted from damages to an injunction. It
had thus interpreted the requirement of actual damage, integral to the

88.

Id. at 13. As the court observed:

While the eBay decision could be read to require an interference that was more than
negligible (as did the court in Ticketmaster), this Court concludes that eBay, in fact,
imposes no such requirement. Ultimately, the court in that case concluded that the
defendant’s conduct was sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass not because the interference was ‘substantial’ but simply because the defendant’s conduct
amounted to ‘use’ of Plaintiff’s computer.
89.
90.
91.

Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944 (Cal. App. Super.).
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 (2001) (Hamidi–II).
See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
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American doctrine as emanating from the law’s reluctance to award
nominal damages for a trespass to a movable. In the court’s reading,
once it was made clear that the plaintiff was not seeking damages at all,
but an equitable remedy instead (as Intel was), then the issue of actual
92
damage became moot altogether.
This raises an interesting question—whether the self-help precondition implicit in an action for trespass to chattels has some connection
only with a claim for monetary damages. From one perspective, the condition relates to and derives from the nature of the resource in question (i.e.,
a movable) and therefore has little to do with the nature of remedy sought.
From another reading (presumably, the court’s), by seeking an injunctive
remedy, the plaintiff was conceding that self-help measures hadn’t
worked to curtail the trespass. Consequently, there was no need to insist
on an actual damage requirement since the inadequacy of self-help was
central to the very remedy sought. On closer analysis, the injunctive
remedy argument actually reinforces the requirement for a showing of
actual damage. This is because before being granted injunctive relief,
plaintiffs are required to show actual or potential damage that cannot be
compensated by monetary damages. Presumably, a failure to show that a
possessory interference had resulted in actual (present) damage would
lead to a conclusion against the occurrence of such damage in the future
as well, resulting in the denial of the injunction.
Further, a distinction ought to be drawn between situations where the
damage is inherently incompensable (the standard for injunctive relief)
and those where the damage is legally incompensable (nominal damages—never awarded in a trespassory action). The court seems to have
equated the two to derive a general reluctance in the law to award damages for a trespassory action and conclude that since the law prefers selfhelp to damages wherever possible, so too should it prefer injunctive
relief to damages. This conclusion is absurd, since the law bases the
award of an injunction on the incommensurability of potential damage,
while its preference for self-help derives from the presumptive immateriality of the damage. The categories of incommensurability and
immateriality are indeed distinct—one derives from the impossibility of
93
assessment and the other from the triviality of the assessment.
What the court was thus implicitly saying was that a claim for an injunction (instead of damages) obviated the need for primary recourse to
self-help as an enforcement mechanism. This point merits some discus-

92.
Hamidi-II, supra note 90, at 249.
93.
It could of course be argued that when analysed in economic terms, the law’s choice
is the same in both cases.
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sion. At the core of the debate lies the question whether the element of
self-help relates more to the nature of remedy ordinarily sought (i.e.,
damages) than it does to the nature of the resource (i.e., movability) or
vice-versa. Richard Epstein seeks to undertake this inquiry by examining
whether the fact that the law does not allow a trespassory claim (over
chattels) without damage is an indication of its non-actionability (i.e., a
remedial issue) or alternatively, of the fact that it is not altogether a
94
trespass, legally. If the element of actual damage is indeed a remedial
issue (as also its corollary, self-help), it would leave intact the fact that a
trespass had actually occurred and thereby enable a court to vindicate the
right infracted by modeling an alternative remedy, presumably an equitable one (i.e., an injunction). If on the other hand, the issue were indeed
a substantive one—rendering the defendant’s action itself short of trespass, then no novel remedy would be permissible. Epstein seems to
conclude that the actual damage issue relates to the actionability of the
wrong, the wrong itself deriving from the inviolate nature of any proprie95
tary interest. While the apparent dichotomy between American and
English law on the point of actual damage may actually buttress this
conclusion, yet, the matter may not be as straight-forward as it is made
out to be.
Conceptually, property is generally understood as a bundle of rights,
with the right to exclude often characterized as the most important right
within that bundle. Indeed, some even argue that the right to exclude is
96
the basis on which all conceptions of property revolve. In this reading,
property is less of a ‘thing’, than it is a right (or collection of rights)—a
right to a resource, characterized by a right to exclude others from that
resource. In the absence of this exclusionary element (i.e., if the right
were merely one of use/access), it would make little sense to talk of
property rights, since there would be nothing to distinguish public and
private ownership. It is precisely this point that James Harris makes
when he notes that the term ‘common property’ is in reality a misnomer
in that it makes reference to the complete absence of proprietary institu97
tions over a resource: a form of non-property.
Given this centrality of exclusion to a proprietary interest, a restriction placed on invoking the law to enforce an exclusion, functions as a

94.
Epstein, supra note 6, at 153. As he observes—“If any invasion, however small,
counts as a compromise of the exclusive right of possession, why should there ever be any
nonactionable trespasses?”
95.
Id. at 153.
96.
See generally, James E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (1997). Penner of
course argues that the bundle of rights conception of property is a useless metaphor.
97.
J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 109–10 (1996).
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fundamental modification of the very interest in question and not just of
its allied consequences. This point is critical and merits some elaboration. If we assume the working definition of a proprietary interest to be
the right to exclude, by legal process, another’s unauthorized use of a
resource, then a re-postulation of this right that eliminates the element of
recourse to legal process ought to be deemed a modification of the very
right in question. To this, it might be argued that the proprietary interest
lies in the very right to exclude, independent of any legal process. This
exclusionary element, however, it is submitted, is not in the nature of a
right but of a privilege, in the Hohfeldian sense. In the Hohfeldian analysis, a right represents a legal claim which places another individual or
98
group of individuals under a duty (usually a negative one). The content
of the right derives primarily from its correlative, the duty. A privilege on
the other hand, to Hohfeld was characterized by no one else having a
99
right or claim to restrict the activity privileged. In this sense therefore, a
privilege is defined by its positive content. Thus, the owner of a piece of
land has the right to eject a trespasser and the privilege of building a
house on his land (characterized by all other individuals having a duty
not to enter the land and not having rights to restrict the owner from
100
building the house, respectively).
Consequently, the exclusion which the law presumes (in a trespass to
chattels action) does not derive from a right or a claim, but rather from
the privilege of the owner to control the resource (movable) in a way that
effectuates this exclusion. To take a concrete illustration—if a person
owns a rubber ball (movable), the law does not grant to him the legal
right to exclude all others who may simply touch the ball, i.e., it does not
place them under a correlative duty of ensuring that they do not so touch
the ball. But what it does however do, is that it enables (i.e., privileges)
the owner to use the ball in such a way that he effectively excludes these
others from touching it (e.g. by putting it in his pocket) and when he so
uses it, it denies these others any rights/claims to prevent him from so
using it.

98.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913–14) (Hohfeld-I). Hohfeld went on to apply
these constructions (i.e., jural opposites and correlatives) to the analysis of property as well,
see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1916–17) (Hohfeld-II).
99.
Id. at 32. As he observes, “The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay
off.”
100.
Interestingly, James Harris captures the same distinction in his analysis of property
as a combination of (a) open-ended use privileges, (b) bounded by a trespassory right. The
former is defined by its positive content and the latter by the existence of a correlative duty in
others. Harris, supra note 97, at 63.
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The law of trespass to chattels thus converts the right to exclude into
a privilege of excluding, and thus effectively modifies the substantive
content of the ordinary proprietary interest (i.e., in relation to immovables). In analyzing the difference in standards of review adopted for the
actionability of trespass and nuisance claims, Thomas Merrill concludes
that a variation in the standard of actionability (for exclusion) is effectively a modification of the substantive property entitlement, given the
101
centrality of exclusion in the discourse. A trespass (to land), to be rendered actionable needs little more than proof of actual physical
infraction (i.e., a per se standard), while an action for nuisance requires a
showing by the plaintiff that the action is ‘unreasonable’ and results in
‘significant harm’ to his interests. It thus requires showing both that the
harm is beyond a threshold de minimis level and that the harm itself is
caused by an activity that brings less benefit than the harm it results in
102
(the reasonableness element). The trespass to chattels doctrine lies
somewhere on the spectrum between trespass to land and nuisance—in
that it isn’t actionable per se, but merely requires a showing of some actual harm (as opposed to significant or unreasonable harm). In its being a
deviation from the per se rules of normal trespass, it effectuates a modification of the proprietary interest in question. Consequently, the element
of actual harm and its corollary, the presumptive sufficiency of self-help
are elements that relate not just to the actionability of the claim in a remedial sense, but to the essence of the very wrong in question.
Epstein seems to concede that this is indeed what happens in relation
to nuisance and in its insistence on the harm caused being serious; it thus
103
modifies the very property interest in question. His analysis concludes
that the reason for this rule is a ‘live-and-let live’ rule of reciprocity followed by the common law—that the loss of the action is compensated by
a simultaneous release from the actions of all others. He notes however
that this is not the same with trespass to chattels (in the electronic con104
text) and the self-help/actual damage rule. His reasoning is that
whereas in relation to nuisance, the law gives individuals reciprocal
easements over each others’ property rights in the interest of a Pareto
improvement, in relation to trespass to chattels, the law keeps intact the

101.
Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property Rights,
14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 19 (1985).
102.
Id. at 18–19.
103.
Epstein, supra note 6, at 156. “The property rights in land are redefined precisely
because the allocative consequences are positive, and the implicit level of redistribution when
all is said and done is zero.”
104.
Id. at 154–55. For a more elaborate analysis by Richard Epstein of the tort doctrine
of nuisance and its utilitarian constraints see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Leg. Stud. 49 (1979).
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initial allocation and merely denies injunctive relief. He also notes that
there are no similar Pareto improvements to be had from a reciprocal
105
forbearance as there exist for nuisance. As the previous discussion
should make clear, the law does in fact recognize reciprocal releases by
its conversion of exclusion from a right to a privilege, where it releases
individuals from the duty they were correlatively placed under, by ordinary trespass law. Further, there appears little reason to believe that a
similar Pareto improvement does not exist in relation to chattels as
well—where mere use without harm or deprivation to the owner seems
to be mutually beneficial.
Epstein’s argument distinguishing actionability and wrongfulness
may derive some force from the language used by the Restatement in
relation to trespass to chattels. As discussed earlier, § 218 requiring actual harm to the chattel deals with the issue of liability for a trespass to a
chattel, the actual contours of the trespass being defined in § 217. Interestingly however, the Restatement uses similar language in relation to a
private nuisance as well, preferring to speak in terms of liability for a
106
private nuisance, rather than enumerating its constituent elements. This
makes it amply clear that the distinction between actionability and
wrongfulness is not as absolute, for these causes of action.
Going back to our discussion of the Hamidi case, the Court of Appeal was thus mistaken in believing that the requirement of selfhelp/actual damage was irrelevant when the remedy sought was an injunction rather than damages, since it remains integral to the nature of
the wrong being sued upon to begin with. To further buttress its arguments, the court however placed nominal reliance on the catena of caselaw on cybertrespass that had interpreted the harm element very loosely,
to conclude that in the present case too, harm was actually caused by the
107
diminution of system resources (as in CompuServe) and by the disruption it caused to the plaintiff’s business system, by requiring the
108
recipient employees to ‘confront, read, and delete’ the multitudinous
messages. References to these forms of harm appear to serve little more
than a palliative function; in attempting to liken the case at hand to past
precedents (which themselves adopt questionable reasoning).

105.
Id. at 157–58.
106.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979), which reads, “One is subject to
liability for a private nuisance if, but only if . . .,” while Restatement, supra note 33, at § 218,
dealing with trespass to chattels provides, “One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject
to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if . . . .” The structural similarity between
the two provisions is plain.
107.
Hamidi-II, supra note 90, at 250.
108.
Id.
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Kolkey J, in his short but strongly worded dissent drew attention to
109
the absurdity of the majority’s position regarding actual injury. For
one, he pointed out that it went well beyond the existent law and that it
was far too innovative to consider the time expended on reading unwanted email messages a form of injury under the common law.
Reiterating the centrality of actual harm to the tortious claim and showing how the previous cases had in fact involved such harm, he then
proceeded to show how a modification in the remedy sought (i.e., injunction instead of damages) did not eliminate the need to show actual
110
injury.
On further appeal to the California Supreme Court, the matter was
examined in great detail and the findings of the majority in the Court of
111
Appeal reversed, by a narrow 4–3 majority. The gist of the majority’s
reasoning was that the tort of trespass to chattels should not be expanded
to encompass a mere electronic communication that neither impaired the
system nor interfered with a legally protected interest of the owner. The
court further reasoned that the injury, if any, that the plaintiff had sustained in having its employees read the emails sent by the defendant was
purely consequential and depended more on the content of the message
than the message itself—similar to receiving an unpleasant letter by or112
dinary mail. Interestingly however, the court reviewed all the previous
lower court decisions that had applied the doctrine of trespass to chattels
to the Internet to find liability, and concluded that they were materially
different from the case before it, in that the courts there had been shown
the existence of actual harm. This affirmation of the open-ended harm
interpretation adopted in these decisions, coupled with the court’s recognition of the centrality of harm to the claim seems at best inconsistent
and at its worst, hypocritical.
The Court thus went on to approve the decision in CompuServe and
its finding that the use of disk space and processing power was an impairment; the ruling in eBay that the threat of future harm if the
defendant’s activities were not restrained constituted sufficient harm for
the action and the decision in Register.Com where the court found the
existence of harm even when the plaintiff conceded that it was unable to
determine the exact nature and extent of the burden the defendant’s ac-

109.
Id. at 258.
110.
Id. at 260–63. To use his words, “Relaxation of the injury requirement would not
merely adapt the tort, but change its nature . . . Dispensing with the requirement of injury to
the value, operation, or condition of the chattel, or the possessory interest therein, would extend the tort’s scope in a way that loses sight of its purpose.”
111.
Intel Corp, Inc. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003) (hereinafter Hamidi-III).
112.
Id. at 1347.
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tivities were placing on its systems.113 The court found that Intel had suffered no similarly equivalent harm meriting injunctive relief under the
doctrine, since the harm it was complaining of was one which had little
to do with any of its proprietary interests. Its refusal to find in favour of
the plaintiff, while at the same time expressly approving previous cases
where the damage requirement had been rendered moot has only added
to the existent confusion and ambiguity discussed earlier.
The decision of the court is even more interesting when one considers the fact that it was presented with a completely different alternative,
at the very outset. Prof. Richard Epstein had in an amicus brief suggested that the court abandon the actual damage requirement of trespass
to chattels in favor of a ‘trespass to real property’ analogy for the Inter114
net. The court however refused to adopt this line of reasoning,
concluding that the suggestion derived more from an attempt to create
Internet metaphors from real-world situations. It proceeded to reason
that the creation of an independent inviolability regime for computer
servers would have the effect of ‘propertizing the Internet’ and was
115
something that ought not to be undertaken without sufficient study.
The court’s reasoning that such a propertization would have the effect of generating new costs on the Internet is indeed laudable.
Independent of any substantive merits which the Epstein suggestion may
or many not have had, it certainly would have provided the area with the
much required doctrinal clarity. The court’s insistence on analyzing the
Internet through its physical media (i.e., computer servers) and generating electronic metaphors to deal with their unauthorized use (i.e., the
passage of electrons or robots) only deepens the conceptual confusion
inherent in the doctrine of cybertrespass. The court was presented with
the opportunity of moving it away from the chattel-analogy, but turned it
down. Coupled with its perfunctory approval of the previous line of
cases as establishing a meaningful standard for actual harm, it muddles
up the area of law even further.
What then should the court have done, ideally? Assuming that the
court was genuinely concerned about the implications of creating an
open-ended inviolability regime for Internet property as Epstein was
suggesting, it could still have made an effort to add some substantive
content to the actual harm requirement by laying down an identifiable
threshold requirement for the future. By preferring instead to distinguish
the present case from previous ones on a largely vacuous factual basis,

113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1354–55.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1360–62.
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the decision left itself open to being criticized as doing little more than
finding an excuse to deny the plaintiffs the remedy they sought. This was
precisely what the dissenting opinion of Brown J did, when it accused
the majority of expressing an unfounded ‘antipathy toward property
116
rights’.
In a sense therefore, the California Supreme Court had legitimized
the largely subjective and abstract determination of actual harm, of the
previous courts as a consequence of its own finding that the facts before
it did not disclose the existence of such harm. By thus creating a negative set of circumstances where an action would not be made out (as in
the case before it), it presumptively added content (in the sense of a
standard) to an equivalent positive set, where the action would lie. In
reality however, the positive set never acquired such content. In School
117
of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, a decision that followed shortly after the
California Supreme Court’s ruling, the doctrine of cybertrespass was
expanded even further. The defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff
posted false job-listings on a web site causing users to send numerous
emails to the plaintiff’s account, and also forwarded the plaintiffs’ email
address to various pornographic websites, which resulted in the plaintiff
receiving large volumes of explicit emails. It is important to note that
unlike in the Hamidi case, the defendant had not directly sent any email
to the plaintiffs, but had only facilitated the same by providing the lat118
ter’s contact details. While it dismissed several of the plaintiff’s claims,
the court concluded that trespass to chattels was the only viable cause of
action that could be pleaded in the instant case. Concluding that the defendant had ‘caused’ large volumes of unsolicited emails to be sent to the
plaintiffs, which had in turn depleted its hard disk space and processing
power, the court found the element of harm to have been satisfied. Predictably, the court placed reliance on the Hamidi dictum that the action
was not sustainable without actual damage, but concluded that this was
indeed not the case here since a prima facie case of damage had been
119
made out.
A direct consequence of the Hamidi decision was thus that it crystallized the ambiguity and reaffirmed its presence in the realm of

116.
Id. at 1368. Indeed, it could be argued that Brown J’s opinion went much further
than merely showing how the plaintiff had indeed sustained actual harm along the lines of the
prior cases. For one, he makes the argument that even a harmless trespass is actionable under
the law. Further, the opinion also attempts to show how the plaintiff had sustained damages
that ought to be sufficient to satisfy the legal standard, even though prior case is to the contrary—economic loss, a loss in utility and a diminution in subjective value.
117.
771 N.Y.S. 2d 804 (2003).
118.
Id. at 807.
119.
Id. at 807–08.
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cybertrespass. While some have commended the decision as exhibiting a
120
reasoned reluctance to propertize the Internet, it nevertheless failed to
provide a strong analytical basis for its final conclusion (i.e., approving
of the loose damage standard evolved by lower courts for chattels while
refusing to adopt a realty metaphor)—and is thus in a sense, neither here,
121
nor there.
D. Why Use the Trespass to Chattels Metaphor?
In developing the doctrine of cybertrespass, courts thus had the option of choosing between the laws of trespass as applied to movables and
the alternate version that applied to immovables, for their analysis—and
they chose the former. It is important to note that this decision was a
conscious one, for they were on two distinct occasions (i.e., eBay and
Hamidi) sought to be persuaded by counsel to adopt an analysis of Internet sites in terms of immovables. What then motivated this choice of
metaphor? The choice of metaphor seems additionally intriguing, given
the doctrinal gymnastics that courts have played to ensure that the cause
of action remained within the realm of trespass to chattels.
In Hamidi, the California Supreme Court rejected the realty metaphor, observing that it added little value, since the doctrinal requirement
of a physical intrusion (in opposition to a mere intangible one) extended
122
to trespass to land actions as well. More importantly though, the court
justified its choice of metaphor by the simple argument that in the end
computers, the communication devices involved, were in reality no different from pre-existent ones, which were all forms of personal property.
It observed: “The plain fact is that computers, even those making up the
Internet, are like such older communications equipment as telephones
and fax machines personal property, not realty.”123

120.
Pamela Samuelson, Unsolicited Communications as Trespass?, 46(10) Commun.
ACM 15 (2003) (noting that the decision brings much needed balance to the law of trespass as
applied to the Internet). Cf. Patty M. DeGaetano, Note, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Private Property, Keep Out—The Unworkable Definition of Injury for a Trespass to Chattels Claim in
Cyberspace, 40 Cal. W. L. Rev. 355 (2004) (arguing that the Court ought to have recognized
economic damage as sufficient injury).
121.
The majority also seemed to have been influenced to some extent, albeit a minimal
one, by the implications a finding of liability would have had on the defendant’s First
Amendment rights. They expressly noted that the granting of an injunction in the instant case
would take the matter out of the realm of private action to that of state action, which would in
turn have to satisfy First Amendment restrictions. Hamidi-III, 30 Cal. 4th at 1364.
122.
Hamidi-III, 30 Cal. 4th at 1361. This conclusion is indeed questionable since the
very basis on which the doctrine of electronic trespass was evolved by the court in Thrifty-Tel
was the actionability of intangible intrusions onto immovable property owned by a plaintiff.
Thrifty-Tel, supra note 40; notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
123.
Id.
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In relation to the Internet, it remains a well-established principle that
the nature and extent of legal protection accorded to any action depends
124
on the metaphor chosen to analyze the action in question. Each metaphor thus brings out and highlights certain factual similarities to the
metaphorical source and downplays others and in so doing, thus modu125
lates the nature of legal analysis. This would certainly have been the
case with the doctrine of cybertrespass—a metaphor of realty may have
meant a radically different regulatory regime for website use and access.
An alternative method of analyzing the choice between the metaphors of chattel and realty is in terms of the perspective adopted for the
analysis. Orrin Kerr seeks to establish that much of the confusion surrounding the development of Internet law relates to the issue of
126
conflicting perspectives adopted for the analysis. According to this
theory, any action on the Internet can be analyzed from either an internal
or an external perspective. An internal perspective involves ‘treating the
127
virtual world as if it were real’ —i.e., analyzing the Internet in terms of
the real world, but on an experiential basis. For instance, to the user of
the Internet, an internal perspective would involve the understanding that
in accessing a web-site, the user is being taken to the webpage involved.
An external perspective on the other hand, involves analyzing the Internet (virtual world) not from a superficial or experiential basis, but in
concrete real-world terms that involve the physical corporeality of the
128
network and related communication technologies employed. In this perspective, the user of the Internet never really visits a web-page, but merely
enters into his computer a set of instructions which allow it to retrieve information and data from another computer on the network, using a
specific communications protocol. In our discussion of cybertrespass then,
the realty metaphor would represent an internal perspective and the chattel
analogy, its external variant.
Now, the external perspective obviously exhibits greater fidelity to
the physical reality of what exactly transpires during an Internet com-

124.
See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 709 (1995) (analyzing the constitutionality of
encryption regulations). See also Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1207 (2002) (arguing that it is
more prudent to analyze the internet using the metaphor of a feudal society).
125.
To take the illustration of encryption—the legal consequences that would invariably
follow if courts were to analogise encryption to language would be different from those that
would follow if the analogy were to an envelope instead. Id. at 884.
126.
Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Georgetown L.J.
357 (2003).
127.
Id. at 359.
128.
Id. at 360.
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munication. But this does not necessarily imply that the internal perspective is any less true, when adopted as a mode of regulatory analysis. Kerr
believes that the selection of perspective ought to depend either on the
perspective implicitly suggested by the doctrine being invoked in a situation or on the perspective of the party which the law in question seeks to
129
regulate.
In the realm of cybertrespass however, this does not necessarily explain the judicial preference for the chattel metaphor. For one, there isn’t
a single doctrine in question—there exist two independent causes of action, each adopting a differing perspective. Consequently, neither
doctrine even so much as alludes to a perspective to be adopted. Secondly, it isn’t clear who exactly the doctrines are targeted at. This is a
logical consequence of the doctrines being proprietary in nature; they
thus operate in rem (against the world at large), with no clearly defined
target. Kerr’s analysis thus isn’t particularly helpful in identifying the
reasons for the courts’ adoption of the chattel metaphor in relation to
cybertrespass.
The perspective-based analysis may however prove useful in pointing us in the direction of a plausible explanation. As noted previously,
the external perspective is significantly closer to the technological reality
of what actually happens during an Internet communication. It thus exhibits greater affinity to the physical/corporeal world and becomes less
of a metaphor, in terms of abstraction. This intuitive urge to associate
property concepts to a tangible entity (i.e., a res) is indeed something
that property theorists have observed in the past.
In analyzing continental legal systems, scholars have often noted
how they often do not have a term equivalent to ‘property’ as it is understood in the common law tradition. For instance, the German law
concept of ‘eigentum’, which is often taken to be equivalent to the idea
of property, is conspicuous in its limited application to tangible property,
land or corporeal movables. Given then that tangible property is the
paradigmatic case of the very concept of property, classifying an intangible entity as a thing capable of being subjected to property rights is
either (a) dependent on identifying a (sufficiently) tangible element for
130
the right or (b) a complete non sequitur. One finds a divergence of
opinion among continental European theorists on this issue.
Wolfgang Mincke argues that to justify the broader usage of the term
‘property’ to cover intangibles, some underlying universal substratum

129.
Id. at 389–405.
130.
James Harris, Property—Rights in Rem or Wealth?, in Themes in Comparative
Law 51, 52 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto, eds., 2002).
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needs to be found.131 On analysis, he concludes that the concept of ‘naked value’ provides this substratum, allowing for the propertization of
intangibles in an attempt to generate and exchange the social value derived from them. To him, it is only this substratum that converts what
would otherwise be a simple in personam right into a proprietary in rem
132
one. According to Mincke therefore, for a property right to exist in an
intangible, the tangibility of the resource must be replaced by the fictional element of ‘value’ or marketability. He however concedes that this
133
replacement occurs, not intuitively but for consequentialist reasons.
Bouckaert however believes that such fictions have little value. Arguing
specifically in the context of intellectual property rights, he concludes
that the centrality of the tangible res to a property discourse necessarily
implies that a dilution of the same renders the right non-proprietary, i.e.,
134
a personal right rather than a real one. To him, property conceived of in
terms of a real right consists of complete physical control over a resource by a person coupled with a legal rule recognizing this control
within the legal system. Consequently, all other rights (in relation to intangibles) are necessarily qualified as ‘partial alienations of this right to
135
complete control.’ In this reading therefore, a property right over an
intangible entity is a misnomer, since the element of complete physical
control is a legal fiction, not a physical reality. While they undoubtedly
disagree over the possibility of a fictional substratum substituting the
tangibility element, they both however seem to agree that paradigmatically, all conceptions of property are premised on the existence of a
tangible, physically controllable resource.
The intuitive connection between person and thing, on which the
136
tangibility element is premised is thus, often justified as pre-legal. It is
indeed representative of the libertarian conception of rights, character-

131.
Wolfgang Mincke, Property: Assets or Power? Objects or Relations as Substrata of
Property Rights, in Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds 78 (J.W. Harris,
ed., 1997).
132.
It is important to note that Mincke’s primary concern is with what the common law
terms “choses in action” which involve the transferability of contractual debts. It however
seems perfectly legitimate to extrapolate his argument to intangibles generally, as Jim Harris
does. Harris, supra note 130, at 52.
133.
As Mincke observes, “We need to be able to transfer obligations. Our economy
would come to a halt without that possibility. So we need to model our legal tools according to
this need.” Mincke, supra note 131, at 83.
134.
Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 775, 796
(1990).
135.
Id. at 794.
136.
As Harris argues is the case with Bouckaert’s analysis, Harris, supra note 130, at
52.
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ized by Harris as the ‘domain conception’ of rights.137 In this conception,
which prominent philosophers such as Nozick subscribe to, individual
rights subsist in a personal sphere of action, in turn fenced off by duties.
They thus involve the entire sphere of what the individual may do as
long as he doesn’t breach the fencing duties. They represent an openended set and are impossible to be enumerated in finite terms. Consequently, very often, their legitimacy is determined principally by
evaluating whether the individual has breached a fencing duty or not,
and if he/she hasn’t, then assuming that the activity is within the rights’
138
domain.
It is therefore plausible to argue that the court’s decision to adopt the
chattel metaphor and analyze the activity in terms of the individual computers constitutive of the Internet rather than in terms of the network
itself, created by those very computers is a reflection of the intuitive appeal of the ‘tangibility paradigm’, connected in turn with the domain
conception of rights. The intrinsic appeal of a paradigm that enables
owner-based physical control over a resource so as to render excludability a factual as opposed to a legal reality, is but obvious. This element is
139
also occasionally referred to as the ‘propertiness of property’ —the test
of property being whether something can be taken from an individual.
Consequently, the courts’ readiness to construct their analyses around
what they could see, feel and physically control with a greater degree of
certainty (i.e., the individual computer or server), seems understandable.
Added to this is of course, the inherent complexity of the law of realty. Had a realty-based metaphor been adopted for Internet trespass, it is
conceivable that at least a part of that complexity would have carried
over to the Internet, and the courts’ reluctance to deconstruct land law
for the Internet may indeed have been another consideration. Indeed, it
was precisely the necessity for this complexity that proponents of the
realty metaphor for cybertrespass made the basis of their arguments,
140
early on. The systemic complexity characterizing the common law jurisprudence of realty is a rather well documented phenomenon.
Writing in 1904, property lawyer James Hogg noted how the English
system of land law was mired in confusion and difficulties that had arisen
as a consequence of the fiction of sovereign title to all land, the system of
estates (legal and equitable) and rules relating to the transferability of the

137.
(2004).
138.
139.
140.

J.W. Harris, Human Rights and Mythical Beasts, 120 L. Quart. Rev. 428, 434
Id.
Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 Camb. L. J. 252, 266 (1991).
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

BALGANESH TYPE.DOC

306

10/2/2006 2:08 PM

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 12:265

fee simple.141 More recently, Kevin Gray and Susan Gray argue that the
common law’s idea of real property ‘oscillates ambivalently’ between
behavioral, conceptual and obligational models, which they characterize
as those of property as a fact, property as a right and property as a re142
sponsibility.
It therefore becomes obvious why courts would have wanted to steer
clear of such a complex body of legal rules. If they had indeed analogized websites to land holdings, in applying the common law doctrine of
trespass, it would have undoubtedly opened up an entirely independent
set of questions, which they would have been forced to answer as well.
What rights would an owner of a website have? Could an authorized
user of a website be characterized as being in lawful possession of the
site? Would such possession result in the user himself having a right of
exclusion? Trivial and comical as they may sound, these questions would
have taken the court into the realm of Internet regulation policy—an area
not legitimately the subject matter for judicial intervention, much less
intervention by national courts.
Given these realities and intuitive underpinnings associated with divergent concepts, one begins to make sense of the courts’ preference for
chattel to realty, for the external perspective to the internal, for the tangible to the ephemeral and ethereal and for the simple to the complex. It
remains to be seen what the implications of these choices are for our understanding of ‘property’ and its continued existence as an independent,
morally-significant reality of social existence.

II. Cybertrespass and the Metaphor of Property
Having thus analyzed the emergence of cybertrespass as an independent proprietary action, we may now proceed to understand the implications
such a doctrine has for our understanding of property and proprietary institutions. As stated earlier, almost all the existent literature on cybertrespass
has focused on understanding the consequences this new proprietary doctrine has for the way in which the Internet operates and is regulated. The
present part focuses on the converse interaction—the consequences of

141.
J.E. Hogg, The Present Complexity of Land Law, and its Remedy, 20 L. Quart.
Rev. 292 (1904).
142.
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, Land Law:
Themes and Perspectives 15, 18 (Bright & Dewar, eds., 1998). See also Kevin Gray & Susan
Francis Gray, The Rhetoric of Realty, in Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn 1 (Joshua Getzler, ed., 2003), where the authors argue that
large parts of real property law consists of little more than rhetoric that stands in for strict
logic or deep rationality.
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such a doctrine on the meaning of property and on the manner in which
property metaphors are deployed as tools of regulation.
A. What is Property? The Meaning (or
Meaninglessness) of Property
143
In his well-known academic piece entitled ‘Tu-tu’, Alf Ross sought
to argue that the concept of ownership was a meaningless construct, with
no semantic reference at all. Analogizing ownership to the tribal ritual he
describes as ‘tu-tu’, Ross sought to demonstrate that the concept, much
like those of ‘right’ and ‘duty’ was a tool for the technique of presentation, devoid of independent meaning and serving a purely functional
144
purpose. Since the term referred to a set of conditions, which in turn
gave rise to another set of consequences, Ross claimed that the term was
completely dispensable. Ross was of course, following in the tradition of
the Scandinavian Realists, who argued that all legal concepts were hollow constructs, and little more than means of social control, which arose
145
from the psychological influence they came to bear on human minds.
While the argument itself appears intuitively appealing, on closer
analysis it is unable to conclusively establish the complete redundancy of
proprietary concepts. Harris categorizes such arguments as representative of ‘psychological reductionism’ and points out how they disregard
the open-texture nature of legal rules, which often requires making refer146
ence to a set of values that a concept has come to represent socially. If
through practice, an otherwise meaningless concept has come to acquire
social significance, does it matter that to a complete outsider, the concept
is hollow? In making this argument, Ross was (and indeed the other
Scandinavian Realists were) assuming that a rule had to be independently meaningful to qualify as legitimate; an assumption that would
question the very roles of custom and tradition in generating legal rules.
While Ross’ argument smacked of a certain lack of cultural sensitiv147
ity, it remains a fact that identifying a universally acceptable definition
for the concept of property, has been a task that property theorists in the
common law tradition have found daunting, since at least the beginning
of the 17th century. Nonetheless property analysts can be shown to share

143.
Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 812 (1957).
144.
Id. at 824–25.
145.
See A. Hagerstrom, Enquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (trans.
C.D. Broad et al., 1953); Karl Olivercrona, Legal Language and Reality, in Essays in Jurisprudence in Honour of Roscoe Pound 151 (R. Newman, ed., 1962).
146.
Harris, supra note 97, at 129–30.
147.
For instance his categorical observation that ‘the talk about tu-tu is pure nonsense’;
Ross, supra note 143, at 812.
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a core minimum, a consensus in their conceptualization of the subject. It
is to be noted that the discussion is restricted to schools of ‘property
analysis’ and by this I exclude the myriad philosophical theories that
seek to justify the very institution of property. While these theories undoubtedly shed light on the concept of property itself, they invariably
exhibit strong connections to the more general political philosophies that
their proponents were advocates for, which in turn largely influenced
148
their analysis.
th
William Blackstone in the mid-18 century defined property as ‘that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
149
individual in the universe.’ Blackstone thus conceived of property as an
in rem right, but attributed to it an absolute status. Scholars have over the
years differed in their interpretation of Blackstone’s conception of the
‘absolute’, with some regarding it as an anomaly (since Blackstone himself permitted the law to impose limitations on the right) and yet others
150
as purposive hyperbole. What is however worth noting about Blackstone’s definition is its identification and use of the element of
exclusivity. To Blackstone it was thus not sufficient that the individual
claimed a dominion over the resource, it was crucial that property also
entailed the exclusion of other individuals’ rights over the same resource.
Blackstone’s understanding of property came to form the focus of
analysis for generations of positivist scholars including John Austin, Jeremy Bentham and others. The main point of intrigue appeared to lie in
Blackstone’s conception of ‘dominion’. On the face of it, there appeared
to be a contradiction, given that the concept of dominium in Roman law
derived from Roman law’s absolutist (absolute, understood here in contrast to relative rights to possession) conception of ownership, which the
151
common law had consciously rejected. Consequently began the process of identifying the in rem rights that together constituted this
dominion.

148.
This would include the Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian justifications for property as
also the theories put forth by Marx, Proudhon and Nozick. For a detailed study of some of
these theories, placed specifically in their broader political context, see Jeremy Waldron,
The Right to Private Property (1996); Harris, supra note 97, at 182–212, 230–246.
149.
2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
150.
See Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54
Cin. L. Rev. 67 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Canon’s of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety,
108 Yale L.J. 601 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); Harris, supra note 97, at 30.
151.
See generally Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of
Absolute Ownership, (1986) Acta Juridica 1.
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At the turn of the 20th century, Hohfeld developed a novel methodology of understanding legal relations, using what he called ‘jural
152
opposites’ and ‘jural correlatives’. Using a matrix consisting of rights,
duties, privileges and a fourth variable (i.e., the no-right), Hohfeld set
out to make the case for a consistent model of judicial analysis. In a subsequent work, he applied this methodology to the analysis of in rem and
in personam legal relations—which he termed, ‘multital’ and ‘paucital’
153
respectively. The crux of Hohfled’s thesis in relation to property was
that property consisted of a large mix of multital jural relations (i.e.,
rights, duties, privileges, etc.), not all of which could be mapped at any
154
given point of time.
Hohfeld’s model eventually gave rise to what is today known as the
‘bundle of rights’ understanding of property, which grew to be im155
mensely popular among the legal realists of the 1920s and 30s. The
bundle conception basically consisted of the idea that property was a
bundle of complex jural relations in rem. To a very large extent, this
bundle conception diluted property of any substantive meaning it may
have acquired in legal discourses. Whereas even Blackstone had emphasized on the element of excludability, the bundle metaphor merely
recognized the ‘right to exclude’ as one among several rights and privileges accorded by the legal system to an owner. The bundle metaphor
however proved to be of significance in functional terms, primarily in
determining whether something had been removed from the bundle and
156
was therefore short of full-property; but it could never answer what full
property was, at any given point of time.
Penner calls this simple version of the bundle metaphor the
‘disaggregative bundle of rights’ understanding and proceeds to show
how it is often used as a palliative for a sense of frustration that develops
from the inability to attribute meaningful content to the idea of
157
property. He notes that this has the consequence of including more
than is necessary under the term and at the same time diluting it of any
152.
Hohfeld-I, supra note 98.
153.
Hohfeld-II, supra note 98.
154.
Id. at 746.
155.
See generally Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1938)
(where the author attempts to understand Hohfeld’s analysis from a realist paradigm). While
Hohfeld did not use the phrase ‘bundle of rights’, later theorists have invariably tended to
associate his views on property with the bundle conception.
156.
It has therefore found extensive use by American courts in eminent domain or “takings” cases: see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
157.
J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711
(1996). For an alternative critique of the bundle approach, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773 (2001).
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critical significance it may have as a justificatory mechanism.158 Indeed,
the bundle conception had the effect of developing an understanding of
property in its purely functional terms, much along the lines of the
Scandinavian realists discussed at the beginning of this section. While
not in such direct terms, it too has given rise to a sense of skepticism
over the meaning of ‘property’, by preferring instead to focus on what
property did instead.
In parallel with the bundle conception, developed a utilitarian
framework of property analysis, which focused on analyzing property in
terms of transaction costs and the allocative gains derived from the deployment of the institution itself. Much of the scholarship in this area as
also the entire law and economics movement can be traced back to the
159
seminal work of Ronald Coase on transaction costs. Property in this
understanding is viewed as little more than a collection of use rights with
respect to a resource and one that is capable of achieving allocative effi160
ciency by ensuring the transfer of resources to higher valued uses.
While the bundle metaphor represented a form of ‘conceptual realism’,
the utilitarian model posits itself as a form of ‘economic realism’—
making little effort to understand the institution of property in the form
161
of an in rem right. This complete neglect by legal economists of the
content of property rights, coupled with the growing popularity of law
and economics scholarship in recent times, has only served to deepen the
skepticism with the prospect of identifying any meaning with the concept of property.
Does this then mean that there is indeed genuine reason to be concerned that ‘property’ is soon becoming a meaningless rhetorical term
with little moral or political significance? Thomas Grey seems to believe
that this is indeed what is happening and terms the process the ‘disinte162
gration of property’. Arguing that the bundle of rights conception
represents a conscious effort to undermine the moral significance of the
term, he posits that it is only a matter of time before property ceases to

158.
Id. at 818–20.
159.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
160.
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357 (2001) (arguing that Coase was a hyper-realist and discussing
some of the ramifications of this neglect).
161.
Id. For some of the more prominent works in this genre, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967); Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 16 (1973); Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 3 (1997); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
19.
162.
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: Property 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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be a concept of importance in legal and political discourses.163 Regardless of whether the bundle and utilitarian conceptions of property have
sought to deny property any political significance, there is yet reason to
believe that the wave of conceptual vacuity that characterizes property
discourses under these heads has had the effect of stimulating new work
on the ‘real meaning’ of property. A survey of this work enables the
identification of a common minimum conception of property.
This common minimum derives from the centrality of the concept of
‘exclusion’ in property. The exercise of a property right over any resource is fundamentally premised on the ability to exclude some or all
other individuals from using the said resource at the same time. This
characteristic of ‘exclusivity’ or ‘excludability’ may manifest itself in
different forms—it may be absolute or relative (i.e., it could be exercisable by an individual or a group), it may be in the form of a right or a
164
privilege (in the Hohfeldian sense) and it may be de facto, de jure or a
blend of the two (depending on the nature of the resource, whether tangible or intangible). For a right to be categorized as a property right or as
proprietary in nature, the element of excludability thus becomes critical.
Attempts to construct property theories without the element of excludability prove to be meaningless rhetoric. Take for instance, the idea
of ‘common property’—where everyone is said to have an affirmative
right to use the resource, with no one having a right to exclude another.
Rhetorically, it is claimed that in such a set-up, everyone has a property
right to the resource. In reality however, just the opposite could be
stated, and the situation would not be affected in the slightest way, prac165
tically speaking. Thus, the proposition ‘no one having a property right’
produces the same outcome as ‘everyone having a property right’, which
renders the idea of a property right meaningless. Devoid of the characteristic of excludability, property disintegrates into a meaningless term.
Merrill tracks the uses of the ‘right to exclude’ in property discourses and categorizes them into three—single variable essentialism,
166
multi-variable essentialism and nominalism. Nominalism refers to the
school which believes that property does not have any specified content
and that its constituent elements keep fluctuating (e.g., the bundle conception). Whereas multivariable essentialism believes that the right to
exclude may be necessary but not sufficient to constitute property, the

163.
Id. at 81.
164.
Notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
165.
See Harris, supra note 97, at 111–14, for a discussion of this aspect, which he
terms the “logical priority of private property.”
166.
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730
(1998).
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single variable version believes that it is both necessary and sufficient for
the same. Merrill then proceeds to make a case for single variable essentialism, showing how once the right to exclude is accepted as a part of
property, all other ‘use’ rights which property has come to be associated
with (e.g., the rights to use, transfigure, transfer and devise) flow logi167
cally from it. While Merrill focuses on the excludability as a right (i.e.,
the right to exclude), I would however submit that his core thesis remains the same, even when expanded to the general category of
excludability, which would in turn cover both the right to exclude and
the privilege of excluding.
Merrill mentions both Penner and Harris as being other prominent
essentialists, in their reliance on the primacy of excludability in explain168
ing the concept of property. To Penner, the very concept of property
169
depends on the idea that others are to be excluded from a resource. In
his analysis, this exclusionary element is not unprincipled, but rather
grounded in the actual social use which the owner may put the resource
170
to, once such exclusion is effected. In Harris’ model, property is best
understood as consisting of an open-ended spectrum of use privileges all
171
of which are bounded by a protective trespassory rule. Harris uses the
expression ‘trespassory’ in relation to an exclusionary mechanism and
notes that while such a rule is necessary for property, it is of course not
172
sufficient.
There thus seems to be a growing consensus among theorists that excludability forms the sine qua non of any conception of property. Indeed,
this is often taken for granted in a few well-known recent attempts to
173
apply a property-based analysis to issues of regulation. Identifying
property with excludability in relation to a resource, thus has the effect
of adding substantive conceptual content to the term. Now, if property is
effectively about exclusion, one begins to understand how in a large

167.
Id. at 740–52.
168.
Id. at 734–35.
169.
Penner, supra note 96, at 74.
170.
Id.
171.
Harris, supra note 97.
172.
Id. at 24.
173.
For instance, the well-known problem of the “anti-commons,” propounded by Michael Heller, is premised on the recognition that a veto right, or a right to exclude someone
from a resource is effectively a property right. To Heller, anticommons property arises in a
situation where a large number of individuals have an exclusionary right over a resource, as a
consequence of which the bundling of these rights in order to use the resource becomes prohibitively inefficient, resulting in an under-use of the resource itself. Heller argues that the
right to exclude and the privileges of use are fundamental to the concept of property. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 666 (1998).
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number of situations the propertization of a resource disables access to a
resource. In the context of tangibles, the exclusion may be de facto (e.g.,
boundaries or fences), but in relation to intangibles, the exclusion becomes de jure. Thus, patents and other rights that go by the name
intellectual property enable such exclusion through actions for infringement, which the have the dual effect of determining the boundaries of
174
the right in question and rendering the same inviolable.
Property is thus inextricably linked to excludability. Consequently,
the creation of an exclusionary regime over a resource, complimented by
(or grounded in) an open-ended and unbounded use-regime over the
same, may appropriately be classified as proprietary in nature. This is
precisely the manner in which the genesis of cybertrespass has had the
effect of creating or defining new property on the Internet. To this, the
obvious objection may indeed be that this may be possible when the resource (or the res) is clearly defined (i.e., tangible), not when it is
transient or ephemeral like the Internet. Two points ought to be given
consideration when this objection is raised.
The first is the basic point that discussions of property have for long
transcended identifying the concept with ‘things’ to understanding it as
175
consisting of rights over or in relation to things. The second is the
point that in relation to intangibles, it is the legal recognition and enforcement of a proprietary right that has the effect of defining the
resource with precision in relation to which the right subsists. The proprietary resource thus comes into existence de jure rather than de facto. I
use the phrase ‘proprietary resource’ here to signify an entity subject to
the exclusionary regime. In the tangible world, the resource is first identified with a fair degree of precision (de facto) and the exclusionary
claim is then exercised over it. For intangibles however, very often the
exclusion comes first, and then the (intended and unintended) consequences of the exclusion are closely examined to identify the resources, to
which access is effectively prohibited. Apt instances would be the eBay
176
and International News Services cases discussed earlier. Since this de
jure process is more often than not conduct-based—exclusion marginally
precedes resource identification, since the impermissible resource-use

174.
See generally Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839 (1990).
175.
Bruce Ackerman identifies this as the layman’s conception of property: Bruce A.
Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977).
176.
See eBay 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000), in relation to which the argument
has often been made that the case created a new property right over the auctioneer’s information, by restricting electronic spider access to the same and INS, where the court admitted to
creating quasi-property over commercially valuable information.
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(that the exclusion works to prohibit) is often an element of a broader
legally impermissible form of conduct. For example, accessing is often
177
an element of copying which is the conduct regulated.
To sum up, excludability provides property with its core content and
exclusionary remedies effectuate the creation of new property rights over
resources. This is precisely how the trespassory remedy of cybertrespass
operates. As an extension of trespass to chattels, it regulates harmful
conduct that impacts a chattel and in so doing enables an owner to exclude others from the same. However, given the nature of the Internet,
the tangible chattel isn’t the only resource from which others come to be
effectively excluded. The multidimensional nature of the Internet effects
an exclusion from more than just one resource and this is where the implications of the same deserve closer analysis, which courts have thus far
seemed reluctant to do.
B. Property: Of Metaphor and Reality
Having thus concluded that the element of ‘excludability’ remains at
the centre of property, this section examines how excludability operates
in relation to different resources. Why ought a regime of excludability
(i.e., property rights) be created in relation to a resource? For tangible
resources, it is generally the case that excludability becomes a prerequisite for usage. This excludability need not be by an individual, but
may be by a finite number of individuals. Consider the following illustration—A is in possession of a cup. Now if A wants to use the cup in his
possession, it would be physically impossible for him to do so, if B or
any other individual were either in physical possession of the cup or using it. Consequently, for A to make effective use of the cup, excluding all
others from it, becomes a physical necessity. The same is the case with
any other tangible resource. As the size of the resource increases, the
only difference becomes the number of individuals that can use the resource, with all others having to be physically excluded again (e.g.,
while land or a house can house a large number of people, it certainly
cannot house individuals up to an infinite number). This characteristic of
the resource is referred to as its ‘rivalrousness’: that multiple (simultaneous) uses (beyond a certain number) of necessity become rival and
178
mutually incompatible.
When we move from the tangible to the intangible world however,
things become different. Take the case of informational goods. The us-

177.
There may indeed be cases where the de jure identification is done legislatively—in
which case, the regulation is not conduct-driven. But these are very rare.
178.
Boyle, supra note 3, at 33, 42.
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age of information resources, is far from being rival. A single piece of
information may be used by an infinite number of individuals simultaneously at any given point of time. Resources such as these are said to be
‘non-rivalrous’ in character; i.e., multiple and simultaneous usage is not
179
physically rival or incompatible. The Internet represents a noninformational intangible resource. Appropriate analogies would therefore
be air or radio waves. The Internet is therefore just as non-rival physically as informational resources.
Indeed, it may in fact be plausible to argue that the Internet exhibits
a form of ‘negative rivalrousness’. In the context of informational goods,
an argument is often made, that though they are physically non-rival,
they nevertheless remain rival in relation to their value. In other words,
the multiple (simultaneous or not) use of the resource has the effect of
depleting the resource of its value, in cases where such value derives
from the reduced availability or scarcity of the resource. The Internet on
the other hand, much like other communication media, derives its value
from its increased usage. It exhibits what economists refer to in relation
to communications media as a network effect. A network effect occurs in
a situation where the value of a service or medium to its users depends
180
on the number of individuals already using the said service or medium.
The Internet, being little more than a network of individual end-users’
computers, thus exhibits a classical network effect. Increased usage of
the resource here, thus enhances its value rather than deplete it. Rivalrousness is thus not just physically non-existent, but conceptually
opposed to the basis on which the Internet functions.
Thus, for tangible resources, the excludability is a product of physical
necessity. In the case of intangibles (informational and non-informational
resources), it derives from an instrumental necessity—the belief that excludability adds (and preserves) value. Given then that intangibles are not
inherently amenable to a proprietary regime, excludability comes to operate de jure not de facto. In other words, the excludability regime is
(artificially) imposed by the law, for instrumental reasons. Actual exclusion can never factually be achieved, except by recourse to the law.
Whereas, by using my cup I can exclude the rest of the world from using
it, I cannot so exclude even my neighbor from reading his copy of my favorite novel, while I do so. Property in relation to intangibles is therefore

179.
Id. See also Lessig, supra note 1, at 94–95.
180.
See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 (1998); see generally, Oz
Shy, The Economics of Network Industries (2001).
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an instrumental creation and derives its justification not from the nature
of the resource, but from the consequences of the counter-factual.
Since there is little intrinsically proprietary about intangibles, ‘propertiness’ (i.e., excludability) is a creation of the law for instrumental
reasons. This imposition of ‘propertiness’ is done through the use of
metaphors, which transplant individual elements of property concepts
from the tangible world to the intangible sphere. Thus, intangible equivalents for the conceptual elements of boundaries, physical control,
possession and the like are created in this process. If property is indeed
about exclusion, then does the instrumental use of the property concept
merely in order to ensure such excludability, have the effect of diluting
property of its moral significance?
Kevin Gray seems to believe that the metaphorical application of
property concepts to new resources to effectuate varying degrees of excludability has the effect of rendering property a vacant concept—an
181
illusion or worse still, a fraud. While conceding that excludability lies
at the core of property, Gray argues that the classification of resources
into excludable and non-excludable for physical, legal and moral reasons
exhibits little coherence and has more to do with the broader power182
relations that ensue from such excludability.
Indeed, the use of metaphorical reasoning to propertize certain resources may at times be hard to distinguish from situations where an
excludability regime is introduced for deontological as opposed to instrumental reasons. This is possibly the reason for a considerable amount of
183
confusion relating to the idea of people ‘owning their bodies’. A trespassory (i.e., excludability) regime here operates to safeguard an individual’s
dignitary (or privacy) interest in controlling his or her own body. The mere
existence of this trespassory regime however, does not render the nature of
the exclusionary right, proprietary. If property were little more than a
synonym for excludability, there might indeed be a strong case for recognizing one’s body as one’s property, but property is more than that.
While excludability is critical to property, the excludability is for
reasons that are independent of the subject to which it is related. Thus in
relation to tangibles, the existence of property rights (i.e., excludability)
is to enable usage of the resource and in relation to informational goods,
it is in order to preserve the value of the resource remaining scarce (and
thereby capture the positive externalities associated with it). In this read-

181.
Gray, supra note 139, at 252.
182.
Id. at 295–307.
183.
See Stephen R. Munzer, Human Dignity and Property Rights in Body Parts, in
Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds 25 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997); J.W. Harris, Who Owns my Body?, 16 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 55 (1996).
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ing therefore, all property is instrumental—excludability for some pur184
pose. This explains why the notion of property in one’s body is flawed
for, here the exclusion is a function of the object of the regime (i.e., the
body) and not for objectively instrumental reasons. It also aptly illustrates that in applying property metaphors to a resource, it becomes
critical to understand the reasons for doing the same.
In discussing the application of the excludability metaphor to property, Gray uses the decision of the High Court of Australia in Victoria
185
Park Racing to understand the consequences of propertization. As
noted previously, the majority in that decision refused to award the plaintiff an exclusionary remedy, arguing that to do the same would be to
recognize in the plaintiff a ‘property’ or ‘quasi-property’ right in a spectacle. Gray argues that in so doing, the court was recognizing that certain
resources were incapable being subjected to an excludability regime for
186
physical, legal or moral reasons. This is possibly just another way of
saying that what the court was doing was examining whether the instrumental reasons for imposing an excludability framework over the
resource were stronger than the physical, legal or moral reasons that existed for not doing so. The court in Victoria Park answered the question
in the negative, while the American courts seem to have answered it in
the affirmative, in relation to cybertrespass.
The obvious next line of inquiry then becomes identifying the possible instrumental reason(s) the American courts might have had in mind
while paving the way for the application of the property metaphor to the
Internet. In this context, it would be apposite to make reference to an
important observation Gray makes in relation to property. Gray argues
187
that property is in the end, all about control over access to a resource.
In this reading, the element of excludability in property, enables an
owner to control access to a resource and in situations where a court
wants to accord de jure recognition to de facto control or alternatively,
where it deems it appropriate to introduce such control de jure, it sanctions the use of a property metaphor. Gray’s use of the word ‘control’ is
indeed interesting, for it takes us into the important philosophical distinction between property and sovereignty that scholars have grappled
with for some time now.

184.
This understanding of property tracks Penner’s version as well, where he observes
that property is a right to exclude grounded in the interest individuals have to use the thing
from which others are so excluded. Penner, supra note 96, at 71.
185.
Victoria Park Racing, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (HCA).
186.
Gray, supra note 139, at 269.
187.
Id. at 292.
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Associating property with control is indeed nothing novel. Blackstone sought to do precisely that, when he used the phrase ‘sole and
188
despotic dominion’. But control however is not unique to the idea of
dominion. Dominion is indeed a proprietary concept, deriving from the
Roman concept of dominium, which in turn meant ‘lordship’ in the sense
189
of an ultimate right to claim the possession and enjoyment of a thing.
This idea is to be contrasted with the Roman law understanding of imperium—a public law concept that roughly translates into the modern
190
conception of sovereign power. A critical distinction is thus to be made
between property and sovereignty.
In a well-known lecture delivered in 1927, the philosopher Morris
Cohen sought to adopt a realist position and show that the increased accumulation of wealth and property at the time was resulting in a
conflation of the two categories of dominium and imperium, rendering
191
the conceptual divide artificial. Arguing that property consisted in excludability, Cohen shows how the accumulation of large amounts of
private property by individuals and corporations enables them to exercise
a large amount of control over the lives of other individuals; not just by
regulating resource access, but also by being in a position to provide services that had hitherto been within the domain of the state. While not
necessarily objectionable for its own sake, Cohen persuasively establishes that there may indeed be a case for the need to examine the
implications of this conflation, given that sovereignty requires the exercise of power with the objective of human welfare, while property often
works on considerations of economic efficiency and other market crite192
ria. The gist of Cohen’s argument is that property is moving from
being an exercise of a right to an exercise of a power (in the Hohfeldian
sense) and this point is indeed well taken.
There thus appears to be very little in choosing between property
and sovereignty as concepts, except that the former is in theory from the
realm of private law and the latter of public law. However, this distinction is far from being water-tight and property can come to be
characterized as sovereignty in certain factual situations (e.g., communal

188.
Blackstone, supra note 149.
189.
Joshua Getzler, Roman Ideas of Land Ownership, in Land Law: Themes and
Perspectives 82–83 (J. Dewar & S. Bright eds., 1998).
190.
See generally David Johnston, The General Influence of Roman Institutions of State
and Public Law, in The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary
Essays 91–94 (D.L. Carey Miller & R. Zimmermann eds., 1997).
191.
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927).
192.
Id. at 29–30.
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property) and sovereignty as property at other times.193 Again, it is quite
possible that the distinction has very little to do with the philosophical
basis of the divide and is more a matter of convenience. Property is thus
capable of being viewed as the delegated exercise of sovereign control,
in relation to a resource or a set of resources.
A private law concept, property is thus capable of being deployed to
achieve a public law purpose—regulation, ordinarily thought to be
within the domain of sovereignty. By regulation here is of course meant
the entire process of governance, the power to regulate individual behavior in so far as it relates to a certain resource. Having identified property
as being a term of largely instrumental significance, its use as a mechanism of governance represents an additional instrumental purpose for
which its excludability framework may be deployed. This process is
however not without its own set of problems and these problems relate
not to the conceptual conflation itself, but to the consequences of the
delegated or decentralized governance.
For quite some time now, the Internet has been considered by many
194
to be a medium incapable of being subjected to regulatory rules. Indeed, some have even sought to characterize the Internet as being
inherently ‘unregulable’. Many reasons are responsible for this, but two
of the rather well-known ones are worth mentioning here.
The first is the fact that the Internet is a trans-national medium. Traditional methods of regulation involve demarcating spaces territorially
and permitting individual nation states (or their units) to govern activities
within each space so allotted to it. The inability of the Internet to be subjected to divisions analogous to those in the territorial sphere has
presented courts and legislatures with innumerable problems, in defining
the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ on the Internet. Innumerable theoretical approaches have been adopted to circumvent the ‘boundary-lesness’ of the
195
Internet, with varying degrees of success. The second reason relates to
the very architecture of the Internet. The Internet (or the worldwide web)

193.
See Joseph Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (observing how American courts use the distinction to their advantage in relation to American Indian
land cases).
194.
See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996); David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 Wayne L.
Rev. 155 (1996); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998);
John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 Harv. J. Int’l L. 207
(1997). See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 395 (2000) (arguing that self-governance
mechanisms ultimately prove to be inadequate without adequate government backing).
195.
Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Great Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. ¶ 5 (2001).
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is a product of different layers of protocols, each of which consists of
software code. Consequently, a modification or variation in this code
results in a change in the way the Internet works. This code is obviously
written by the individual end users whose computers constitute the
Internet and is in a sense, private. The sequitur of this is that any legal
rule can technologically be circumvented or overridden by a modification in the code of the Internet. The commonplace rules of privacy,
access, free speech, sovereignty and the like are all amenable to being
rendered redundant through modifications in the very architecture of the
196
Internet.
The complexity of the Internet therefore presents problems for the
real world rules of spatial regulation. Using the property metaphor instrumentally here, to create a form of delegated sovereignty, is one
approach to overcoming a large number of these problems. Since control
is now effectively decentralized and distributed, its exercise becomes
much more effective. Administrators of individual web sites and servers
can control the access to and use of resources there. The governing law
effectively becomes whatever the code on the website requires. Regulation is thus privatized.
By creating a novel exclusionary remedy for the Internet, in the nature of cybertrespass, American courts were thus deploying the property
metaphor as a regulatory tool. Implicit however, in this privatization of
control and governance was the belief that a decentralized mechanism of
private regulation would produce the same outcomes as mechanisms of
state regulation would, in the real world. In a sense therefore, this is little
more than the same theoretical framework Adam Smith proposed in his
study of wealth maximization where he argued that individuals acting in
197
their self-interest effectively enhanced societal interest.
Regardless of whether Adam Smith was right or not at a general
level, we still need to ask the question whether the privatization of Internet regulation through property metaphors is without its share of
problems. What sets the Internet apart however, is that while it certainly

196.
Lawrence Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). See also David
G. Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1439 (2000); Mark S. Nadel, Computer Code vs. Legal Code: Setting the Rules in Cyberspace,
52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 821 (2000).
197.
See 4 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations ch. 2 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976), where he observes—“Every individual is
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has
in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer
that employment which is most advantageous to the society.”
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is a forum for commerce and a market for economic exchanges, it remains foremost, a medium of communication.
Peter Huber argues that governmental regulation of the Internet
ought to be abolished and instead replaced with a system of rules that
198
evolve through market processes and the common law method. Huber
argues that governmental regulation is inefficient and unproductive,
while privatized regulatory strategies (through zoning and private property rights) results in a more robust and efficient Internet, owing to
199
competition. Huber would therefore find the instrumental use of the
property metaphor in cybertrespass for regulatory purposes to best fit his
hypothesis and his case for common law based private regulation of the
Internet.
Apart from the fact that Huber does not examine in detail the sub200
stantive implications of common law doctrine for the Internet, he also
does not seem to address himself sufficiently to the fact that private law
based regulation very often suffers from the disadvantage of not being
equipped with the public interest safeguards that public law entails. Public law attempts to regulate the interaction between the individual and
the state. Thus, while it grants the state the power to control the behaviour and activities of individuals, it balances the same by in turn granting
individuals—(a) a set of parameters against which to measure the legality of government action (primarily revolving around the criterion of
public interest) and (b) a set of affirmative rights with which to safeguard their own liberty and autonomy (e.g., equality, free speech,
privacy, etc.).
When regulation moves from the domain of public law to private law,
while the power structure is transplanted from the state to private actors,
the checks and balances built into the public sphere are often lost. Public
interest no longer remains at the forefront of the exercise of power/control,
nor need it be, legally speaking. Similarly, individual rights such as free
speech come to be legitimately overridden by proprietary use-privileges.
Thus, if the owner of a website were to make accessing its content contingent on providing some form of personal information or refraining from
saying some things, individual users would be unable to argue that such a
regulation were antithetical to public interest, or more importantly, that it
violated their privacy and free speech rights, as they might have been able
to, in the context of state regulation. Given that the Internet is in the end a
communications medium, a decentralized private system of regulation
198.
Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let
Common Law Rule the Telecosm (1997).
199.
Id. at 7–8, 71–77.
200.
See Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1746 (1999).
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would have the direct effect of allowing free expression rights to be
overridden by property rights. Now, it could be argued that since a property right is effective only when it is recognized and enforced by the
state, and consequently, the entry of the state into this process would enable individuals to assert their rights indirectly. This was indeed
attempted on two separate occasions in relation to cybertrespass.
In CompuServe, the defendants asserted that though the plaintiff was
a private actor, since it has a large quantum of control over a communications medium, it could be subject to First Amendment restrictions that
201
enabled the property right to be overridden. The court however rejected
this claim, arguing that it was up to the government to introduce such a
balance and that the First Amendment could be asserted directly, only if
the plaintiff was shown to be a state actor. In Hamidi, the defendant
made a similar assertion, arguing that the enforcement of a property
claim by a court amounted to state action that was in turn subject to First
202
Amendment restrictions. While refusing to examine this claim in detail
since it had held for the defendant on other grounds, the court nevertheless went on to conclude that when the property right itself was sought to
be judicially enforced, it involved a state action that was subject to First
Amendment restrictions. On the other hand, were the property right to be
privately enforced (by the owner), no such restrictions would come into
203
play. It thus is clear that common law proprietary doctrines do not sufficiently account for public interest imperatives and consequently, when
they are used instrumentally for public law purposes (i.e., regulation), it
has the effect of creating a subtle imbalance.
In this reading the deployment of the property metaphor in relation
to the Internet is done for instrumental purposes—to decentralize and
privatize control and regulation. While the instrumentalism itself may be
efficient, it may however prove to be problematic in shifting our understanding of the Internet from one of a freely accessible medium of
communication to a rigidly controlled proprietary resource.
C. Resource or Medium: The Architecture of the Internet
If property in general is really about power and control and in its application to the Internet, attempts to create a privatized regulatory
structure, as we have concluded, there may yet be problems with this

201.
See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1026. Under American law, the general position is
that where a private actor exercises control over a communications medium, the First Amendment enables the government to enact legislation enabling access, in spite of the private actor’s
property rights. See, Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 US 622 (1994).
202.
Hamidi-III , 30 Cal. 4th 1342 at 1364.
203.
Id.
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instrumental approach. The problems are however not those that derive
from the process of propertization of the Internet generally, but those
that are a consequence of the method through which such propertization
is achieved, viz., the common law approach and the doctrine of cybertrespass.
As mentioned previously, the common law effects a creation of
204
property rights through a conduct-based regulatory mechanism. This
involves the use of tort law, to define a category of impermissible activities. In relation to a proprietary right however, these impermissible
activities invariably relate to a resource or an object (i.e., the res). The
rights in the object are defined in opposition to the range of impermissible activities in relation to the same object that an individual (the owner)
is allowed to enjoin by recourse to the law. To illustrate this point, con205
sider the case of Victoria Park Racing discussed earlier and assume for
a moment that the court had in fact found for the plaintiff. The court began its approach by considering the nature of the activity that the
defendant had undertaken. If the court had found the same to be impermissible (for unfair competition or other reasons) and made a declaration
to the effect that ‘the commercial exploitation of another’s investment
and its attributes was impermissible’, it would have served to create a
property right in such an investment and its attributes (the object), but by
excluding the defendant from the same. In other words, in the common
law method of fashioning a property right, conduct comes first and the
object of the proprietary protection only thereafter and solely in relation
to such conduct.
The obvious consequence of the common law’s emphasis on conduct
in this process, is a relative neglect of the perceived need to define the
object of such protection (i.e., the resource). This is of course understandable, given that traditionally, the common law only dealt with
tangible entities, with clearly defined boundaries, in relation to which
206
such definition would have proven redundant and superfluous. But
once the process moved from tangible entities to intangibles, the effects
of this neglect began to manifest itself. It is indeed arguable that one of
the reasons for the court’s reluctance to find for the plaintiff in Victoria

204.
See note 176 and accompanying text.
205.
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Co Ltd v. Taylor, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (HCA).
206.
For example, in an action for trespass to one’s horse, it would have been utterly
meaningless to have required the law to define the object (i.e., the horse) with any precision,
since the boundaries of the object are not merely notional, but real.
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Park Racing was its inability to identify the object in relation to which
207
the exclusion was to be effected.
It could be argued that the attempt to identify an entity with great
precision is a meaningless exercise and one that need not deter courts’
according plaintiffs’ interests proprietary protection. Property could thus
be conceived as existing in anything in relation to which time, effort,
labour or money is expended to enhance its commercial value, regardless
208
of its tangible or intangible nature. This approach to identifying an object worthy of exclusionary protection is not entirely without merit. It is
however inevitably dependent on the instrumental purpose for which the
property metaphor (or concept) is employed. If the object of propertizing
something (i.e., creating property rights over something) is to protect the
commercial value inherent in the resource from depletion through use,
then allowing the resource to be defined in terms of the entity possessed
of value makes perfect sense (e.g. intellectual property rights such as
209
patents). If on the other hand, the instrumental purpose for which the
concept is employed is something else (e.g. regulation), then adopting a
value-based understanding of the object of protection achieves very little.
The move from the tangible world to the virtual is probably more
complicated than the transition from the tangible to the intangible, for
two reasons. The first is that the reasons for employing the property concept here differ (and are not always connected with the protection of
commercial value). The second derives from the nature of the virtual
world (i.e., the Internet) and the manner in which we understand entities
and resources in or on it. We have seen how courts tend to analyze the
Internet as a collective of movables. Even within the paradigm of mov210
ables, they chose to adopt a specific conception of ownership control.

207.
The plaintiff had sought to assert a property or quasi-property right in a spectacle.
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Co Ltd v. Taylor, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479, 479 (HCA) (per
Latham CJ). Kevin Gray uses the Victoria Park case and the opinions of the various judges
therein to identify different reasons why certain resources may be deemed inherently nonexcludable—physical, legal and moral. Gray, supra note 139, at 269–92.
208.
D.F. Libling, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles, 94 L. Quart. Rev.
103, 119 (1978).
209.
It could of course be argued that such an approach is flawed since the reasoning it
adopts is in effect circular: because the value in an object needs to be protected, the object can
be understood as the very entity that possesses such value.
210.
See Harold Smith Reeves, Property in Cyberspace, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (1996)
(outlining three different conceptions of property boundaries on the Internet—the system-level
boundary, the open-system boundary and the individual level boundary models). In relation to
cybertrespass, they seem to alternate between a system level and individual level boundary
model.

BALGANESH TYPE.DOC

Spring 2006]

10/2/2006 2:08 PM

Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet

325

The very adoption of this paradigm of analysis however, may pose certain problems given the unique architecture of the Internet.
Among the various models used to analyze the architecture of the
Internet, the most prominent one is the ‘layers model’. Yochai Benkler
was one of the earliest to employ this model in his analysis of the Internet and his arguments for the creation of a sustainable commons
211
therein. In this model, a communications system can be understood by
segregating it into three independent layers; (a) the physical infrastructure layer, consisting of the hardware (computers, wires, cables) that
physically connects the various computers constitutive of the network;
(b) the logical infrastructure layer, consisting of the myriad software
code and protocols (e.g. TCP/IP, HTTP) that define the way in which the
network operates and through which the hardware interacts and (c) the
content layer, consisting in turn of the actual data that gets transmitted
across the network—the software programs, the information and the
212
plethora of other related material. These layers are sandwiched one
over the other, with the physical layer at the bottom and the content layer
at the very top.
The crucial thing to remember in relation to these layers is that they
are capable of operating independently and consequently, different regulatory regimes exist for each of them. Thus, the physical layer (cables,
hardware) is governed by the ordinary rules of property law (chattels),
while the content layer is governed by rules that determine use and access rights in relation to information and data (such as copyright law). In
making his argument for a digitally networked commons, Benkler notes
how an open-access regulatory mechanism will have to be developed at
213
each individual layer, in order to achieve the same.
However, just because the layers are capable of operating independently, it does not mean that changes at one layer do not influence
another. The linearly sandwiched nature of the layers is responsible for
this. Consequently, a regulatory spill-over remains a distinct possibility.
In a fairly elaborate study of the interaction between the architecture of
the Internet and its regulation, Lawrence Solum and Minn Chung lay
214
down what they term, the ‘layers principle’. The core of the layers
principle states that any system of regulation for the Internet needs to
show respect for the integrity of the layers and this in turn is said to have

211.
Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561 (2000).
212.
Id. at 562; Lessig, supra note 1, at 23.
213.
Id. at 579.
214.
Lawrence Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and
the Law, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 815 (2004).
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two connected corollaries: (i) that regulation should never compromise
the separation between the layers and (ii) the regulation should attempt
to minimize the distance between the layer at which the law aims to produce an effect and the layer directly affected by the regulation in
215
question.
Analyzing the Internet in terms of layers, they go on to propound
two theses. The first, the ‘fit thesis’ postulates that layer-crossing regulations produce problems of fit between the regulatory ends in question
216
and the means employed to achieve the same. The second, the ‘transparency thesis’ states that layer-violating regulations are inherently
217
detrimental to the transparency of the Internet. The misfit is thus supposed to result in regulatory over-breadth and under-inclusion, while the
reduction in transparency is shown to enhance the costs of innovation on
the Internet. Regulation must thus be optimally tailored to focus exclusively on the layer it is directed at, and regulators must make a conscious
effort to guard against violating the layers principle, according to this
analysis.
The doctrine of cybertrespass is essentially a modified version of the
common law tort of trespass to chattels. Its focal point is thus the individual computer/server of a plaintiff—i.e., the hardware. As a doctrine, it
is therefore ostensibly directed at the physical layer of the Internet, attempting to regulate use and access to the hardware end-units, through a
privatized, proprietary mechanism. But is this really what the doctrine is
attempting to regulate? In reality, there may exist reason to believe that
the doctrine is more concerned with regulating web-space itself, rather
218
219
than the physical medium. Take the cases of CompuServe and eBay,
both critical in relation to the evolution of the doctrine. In CompuServe,
the court was ostensibly concerned with the physical intrusion onto the
plaintiff’s physical mail server. The problem however, is that there was
no intrusion or harm to the plaintiff’s physical hardware. The intrusion if
any was at the level of the internal (i.e., logical) mail server and the pro220
tocols involved there (i.e., SMTP ). This is even more obvious in the
eBay case, for there too, the electronic robots did not actually intrude
onto the plaintiff’s computer. They had merely gathered information by

215.
Id. at 817.
216.
Id. at 879.
217.
Id. at 878.
218.
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
219.
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal., 2000).
220.
The abbreviation for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, the protocol that regulates the
transmission of electronic mail messages from one server to another.

BALGANESH TYPE.DOC

Spring 2006]

10/2/2006 2:08 PM

Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet

327

sending requests for the same to the plaintiff’s computers, which had in
turn delivered it to the defendant. There was never any actual intrusion.
What the courts had thus done, in applying the doctrine of cybertrespass, was to base the doctrine on metaphor, rather than reality. Given
that the Internet is often described in terms of metaphors, the court
adopted the ideas of ‘entering’, ‘visiting’, ‘intruding’ and the like to apply the doctrine. In reality however, these activities never happen. When
a person accesses a website by entering the address of the site into a
browser, in reality, the browser never goes or visits any place, it merely
sends information to a server, which in turn transmits information to the
221
user’s computer, according to a set protocol. It is the same information-request process that comes into play in relation to electronic mail as
well. In sum, there was nothing physical about these intrusions. Dan
Hunter notes how, in applying cybertrespass, courts have varied the resource in relation to which the exclusionary rule is sought to be applied
between the computer, the bandwidth, the capacity, the processing power
and the network and that apart from the first one (i.e., the computer)
222
none of the others are chattels, by any stretch of imagination.
The doctrine of cybertrespass was therefore about regulating the
logical layer of the Internet, about how SMTP exchanges might occur
and the manner in which robot protocols could retrieve information from
websites. This was a consequence of the sandwiched architecture of the
Internet. It did not however stop here. The layered nature of the Internet
has also resulted in the doctrine indirectly regulating the content layer as
well. This is most obvious in the eBay case, where the real issue was the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s price information; information valuable,
yet freely accessible in the public domain. The issue also arose in the
Hamidi case, where the real reason for the defendant’s recourse to the
law was the derogatory nature of the defendant’s mails rather than its
223
quantity.
A direct consequence of the courts’ inability to define the object in
relation to which the exclusion is being effected through a common law
method is a regulatory ambiguity, resulting in either an overpropertization or an under-propertization. In both situations, the integrity
of the layers is compromised. Further, given that the physical layer and

221.
Lemley, supra note 4, noting that ‘[t]he Internet is merely a simple computer protocol, a piece of code that permits computer users to transmit data between their computers
using existing communications networks.’
222.
Hunter, supra note 4, at 486.
223.
Hamidi-III, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 at 1358, where the court observed that “fictionally
recharacterizing the allegedly injurious effect of a communication’s contents on recipients as
an impairment to the device which transmitted the message.”
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the content layer are both already the subject matter of regulatory regimes, it is indeed questionable whether the approach of regulating the
intermediary logical layer through either of these layers is appropriate.
If the logical layer is the object of regulation, the common law
methodology of applying a property metaphor instrumentally to achieve
the same is undermined by an inability to identify a bounded object of
the property right, i.e., the thing or the res, an integral element in any
conception of property. Epstein seems to believe that difficulties such as
these are capable of working themselves pure through the common law
224
method incrementally and that there is no reason for worry or caution.
Interestingly, Solum and Chung seem to be precisely against such incrementalism, arguing that since the direction of future innovation on the
Internet remains unknown, even an individual case-by-case utilitarian
balancing approach suffers from a lack of adequate information, which
has the inevitable consequence of compromising the transparency intrin225
sic to the Internet. The common law process of incremental doctrinal
development has been shown to exhibit several critical path dependent
characteristics, most of which derive from its use of precedent and the
226
doctrine of stare decisis. A process is said to be path dependent if its
227
developmental direction is influenced by its own history. Some of the
crucial characteristics of a path dependent common law process or development are: non-ergodicity—where small short-term decisions have
large, unintended long-term consequences; inflexibility—where an early
rule determines future outcomes owing to courts’ unlikeliness to deviate
without strong reason and indeterminacy of eventual outcome—in that
228
the eventual consequence of the rule or doctrine is unpredictable.
In its short history, the common law doctrine of cybertrespass has
seemingly exhibited several of these path dependent characteristics. To
begin with, each of the cases that contributed to the evolution of the doctrine relied on past decisions to reach its conclusion. CompuServe relied
on Thrifty-Tel; eBay on CompuServe; Register.com on eBay; and the

224.
Epstein, supra note 6, at 73, 76, 87.
225.
Solum & Chung, supra note 214, at 854–60. Another reason they cite is the lack of
institutional capacity on the part of regulators to achieve such a case-by-case balancing
through an incremental process.
226.
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 101 (2001).
227.
See Paul A. David, Path Dependence, its Critics and the Quest for a ‘Historical
Economics’, Keynote Address to the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy” Athens Meetings, 7–9 November 1997.
228.
Hathaway, supra note 226, at 129–35.
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AOL cases on CompuServe.229 By the time the Supreme Court of California delivered its judgement in Hamidi, the doctrine had evolved adopting
a chattel (as opposed to realty) metaphor. At this stage, even though the
court seemingly recognized the inadequacies of this metaphor selection,
it was too late for it to effect a complete reversal altogether (exhibiting
non-ergodicity and an inflexible lock-in). Its attempt to rationalize the
past decisions and portray them as being without flaw (in order to avoid
230
having to explicitly differ with them), only resulted in an increased
outcome indeterminacy in the process.
Epstein, in his analysis of cybertrespass is forced to concede that real
property rules offered courts a much better fit than did those relating to
chattels, since ‘cyberspace looks and functions more like real property
231
than chattels.’ Implicit in this concession is the recognition that the
subject matter of the property right (i.e., the thing or the res) in relation
to cybertrespass, namely cyberspace, remains ill-defined. If the common
law process in general and the evolution of cybertrespass in specific are
indeed path-dependent, there appears little reason to be optimistic about
the role of an incremental process in working to remedy these fundamental ambiguities.
The attempt to regulate the logical layer through the market mechanism of creating a common law property right thus suffers from a major
methodological drawback. While regulation undoubtedly concerns individual conduct, a property-rule invariably must involve an identifiable
res in relation to which the conduct is proscribed. A failure to do so obscures the proprietary nature of the right. Property is concededly, about
relations between persons; but these relations invariably manifest themselves around an object (a thing) and never in abstract, for it is only by
masking the individual identity behind an a-personal thing, that the right
acquires its in rem nature.
Yochai Benkler, in his discussion of the allocation of rights in the
wireless spectrum, notes that regulation is ultimately about conduct and
that the use of the property metaphor for regulatory purposes should not
232
result in a dogmatic (and ultimately futile) search for a resource.
Benkler was however not dealing with the common law method of creating property rights through a tortious doctrine, but rather with the

229.
Even if the precedents were not considered binding that they certainly did have
considerable persuasive value is readily apparent.
230.
Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2164, 2182 (2004).
231.
Epstein, supra note 6, at 83. It is open to debate whether this may be taken as a
recognition of the non-ergodicity inherent in the development of the doctrine.
232.
Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environment, 11 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 287, 288 (1997–98).
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process of allocating rights over the spectrum, rights which economists
identify as proprietary in nature. This process of allocating property
rights over an intangible medium can be traced back to Ronald Coase,
233
and his ideas for privatizing the broadcast spectrum. Indeed, this
method of viewing property rights in terms merely of ‘permitted uses’ is
234
characteristic of the economic analysis of law. In this conception, the
‘use right’ (i.e., shooting a gun) assumes more importance than identifying the owner of the resource (i.e. airspace) to which the use relates.
Coase’s preference for viewing the matter in terms of an assignment
of tradable use rights was linked to his use of the law of nuisance to ex235
plain the phenomenon of transaction costs. Much of his argumentation
relating to transaction costs derived from the apparent reflexivity of
harm and the balancing exercise that courts had to carry out in deciding
nuisance claims. Nuisance and trespass, though related, are fundamentally different in their approach. Nuisance involves a balancing exercise,
which some characterize as utilitarian, while trespass ordinarily involves
236
the mechanical application of an exclusionary rule. Consequently, the
need to define the object of the right is less critical in the law of nuisance, given that it focuses almost completely on the defendant’s
behavior and attempts to balance the gains from the same against the
costs incurred by the plaintiff as a direct consequence.
An exclusionary mechanism such as trespass however involves far less
balancing and almost always adopts a near mechanical two step process of
‘intrusion–exclusion’. Identifying the object of the intrusion and the consequent exclusion therefore assumes greater importance. Applying the
237
Calabresi-Melamed model to the trespass-nuisance dichotomy, we see
that while trespass is characteristic of a property rule, the law of nuisance
is aptly representative of a liability rule (in allowing for a court enforced
sale of the right). Thus, adopting a nuisance-based approach to regulating the logical layer of the Internet might have rendered obsolete the

233.
Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1
(1959).
234.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 160, at 372 (noting Coase’s observation that it was
simpler to understand regulating the shooting over one person’s land as a question of what a
person should be allowed to do with a gun, rather than whether the person who so shot actually owned the airspace over the land).
235.
Coase, supra note 159, at 2–15.
236.
For an overview of this distinction, see Merrill, supra 100; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 965 (2004); Epstein, supra
102); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 453 (2002). For a historical overview of the development of nuisance at common law, see Joshua Getzler, A History of Water Rights at Common Law
Ch. 2 (2004).
237.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 19.
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need to define the resource in question and maintained the integrity of
238
the individual layers. Unfortunately, courts did not see the rationale in
this approach.
Even if the instrumental use of the property metaphor to achieve privatized regulation is deemed unobjectionable, the common law method
through which this was sought to be achieved (i.e., the doctrine of cybertrespass) exhibits fundamental conceptual flaws. Property is in the end
about excluding individuals from something for a specific purpose. Assuming that the purpose has been identified, the thing from which the
right operates to exclude individuals is just as important as the element
of exclusion. This point is borne out by the fact that conceptually excludability (in relation to a property right) is meaningful only in so far as
it is balanced by and protects use privileges. Excludability for its own
sake, devoid of use or access privileges does not constitute property. Use
and access are in turn intransitive, requiring the identification of a resource over which they are to operate. Thus, when the resource from
which the exclusion is to operate is poorly defined, it begins to undermine the proprietary nature of the right in question. The continued use of
the property metaphor within such a framework distorts even the most
basic understanding of property—as always being in relation to an identifiable object.

Conclusion
What then happens to the concept of property, as it is used in the
context of the virtual world of the Internet?
The previous discussion has sought to establish that the metaphorical
application of property concepts to the Internet is intricately linked to a
shift in (a) the reasons for which proprietary concepts (based on exclusion) are employed and (b) the primacy of the propertiness of property,
or the need to identify the concept with a bounded resource. The doctrine
of cybertrespass operates at the interface of property and tort law, attempting to vindicate a putatively pre-existent property right, through an
exclusionary remedy. The need for this exclusion derives however neither from the nature of the resource (as it does for tangibles) nor from
the need to protect the value inherent in a resource, which might be depleted through multiple use (as it does for informational resources). It
seems to derive largely from an attempt to deploy the element of control

238.
For arguments advancing a nuisance based approach, see Burk, supra note 4, at 53;
Steven Kam, Note, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and A Doctrine of CyberNuisance, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 427 (2004).
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inherent in the exclusionary feature of a property right to develop a decentralized regulatory structure for the Internet. Property is thus
employed instrumentally, to achieve a purpose not directly connected
with the resource over which the right is to operate. The sequitur of this
is that such an instrumental use avoids defining the real target of the
right, or the resource over which the exclusionary mechanism is meant
to operate.
If we accept that property, at its bare minimum consists of the element of excludability operating over an identifiable thing, employed for
a particular purpose, cybertrespass may thus be viewed as employing the
concept of property instrumentally, through the mechanism of tort law.
On the face of it, the concession that property in this context (and some
others) is largely about instrumentalism, may seem to be arguing for a
form of property skepticism that some theorists have espoused. While it
is true that property may be used for both intrinsic and instrumental purposes, this concession alone need not lead one down the slippery slope
of skepticism.
As noted, a proprietary regime may be deployed for reasons that derive from the rivalrous nature of the resource or, instrumentally, for
reasons that are either connected to or independent of the resource. Applying the concept of property instrumentally is not in itself problematic.
It becomes so however in situations where this instrumentalism comes to
erode the minimum core of property. When this move becomes fairly
well entrenched, the turn to skepticism is indeed not far away. The developing category of cybertrespass illustrates this.
Property, as an in rem right uses the idea of an a-personal ‘thing’ as
239
its focal point to enable interpersonal interactions. The ‘thing’ thus anchors the exclusionary regime, given that excludability as a concept is
intransitive, requiring a resource to become operational. The law of trespass, of which cybertrespass is a derivative, further builds on this, by
presuming public knowledge of the existence of the ‘thing’ and its
boundaries. The doctrine of cybertrespass however, in the manner in
which it has been interpreted by courts, premises its analysis on a metaphorical understanding of the Internet while yet applying a tort law
doctrine that is premised on a physical intrusion. In the process it fails to
identify with any precision the ‘thing’ in relation to which the exclusionary remedy effectively operates. Given the centrality of the ‘thing’ to the
concept of property, this failure effectively results in the instrumental
purpose coming to dominate the very concept. We have already seen that

239.
Penner, supra note 96, at 29; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form,
Context and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1115 (2003).
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this conscious attempt to undermine the relevance of the thing, is something characteristic of the economic analysis of property rights, and can
be traced back to Ronald Coase, who viewed property as consisting of
tradable rights to perform certain activities, rather than ownership privi240
leges. If this method of reasoning is indeed adopted, there may be little
reason to categorize the rights as constitutive of ‘property’, merely because of their tradability. Property consists of more than just the
tradability of rights and derives from the underlying nature of those
rights.
In the end, the doctrine of cybertrespass may represent little more
than legal sophistry. Both sides of the policy debate (on the propertization of the Internet) seem more than ready to lace their arguments with
sophisticated legal concepts and courts have been more than willing to in
turn accept the same. Concepts such as ‘property’ and ‘trespass’ however
come to any discourse with a fairly well defined meaning and a failure to
acknowledge this in its entirety, obfuscates both the meanings of the
conceptual tools deployed and the very purpose for which they are so
deployed. The confusion that currently exists in the law of cybertrespass
on the element of ‘actual damage’ aptly reflects this.
Cyberspace, with its negative rivalry, exhibits little intrinsic need for
propertization. While there certainly may have existed the need to develop a regulatory regime for the Internet, the use of proprietary
concepts for the same under the doctrine of cybertrespass has only resulted in more ambiguity and confusion than it has in any meaningful
regulation. We can look forward to a time when courts come to realize
that regulation and governance on the Internet may be better served by
analytical tools other than property metaphors.

240.

Coase, supra note 233, at 34; Coase, supra note 159, at 44.

